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Extraterritorial Rights in Border 
Enforcement 
Fatma E. Marouf* 
Abstract 
 
Recent shifts in border enforcement policies raise pressing 
new questions about the extraterritorial reach of constitutional 
rights. Policies that keep asylum seekers in Mexico, expand the 
use of expedited removal, and encourage the cross-border use of 
force require courts to determine whether noncitizens who are 
physically outside the United States, or who are treated for legal 
purposes as being outside even if they have entered the country, 
can claim constitutional protections. This Article examines a 
small, but growing body of cases addressing these 
extraterritoriality issues in the border enforcement context, 
focusing on disparities in judicial analyses that have resulted in 
at least two circuit splits. Specifically, the Article explores 
differences in courts’ selection and application of the Supreme 
Court’s main extraterritoriality tests; various ways of 
conceptualizing the interaction between the Court’s 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence and the plenary power doctrine, 
which one appellate court described as “competing” 
constitutional fields; and contrasting approaches to the role of 
separation of powers as a limiting structural principle, given the 
ambiguity of the Constitution’s text regarding its geographic 
scope. The separation of powers analysis reflects particular 
concern about the Executive Branch’s manipulation of the border 
as a legal construct, as well as its manipulation of national 
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security as an illusory threat, in order to evade accountability. 
The Article concludes that extending constitutional protections, 
preserving judicial review, and critically examining demands for 
deference are crucial in this context in order to avoid creating a 
law-free zone just beyond our southern border. 
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I. Introduction 
Countries around the world, following the United States’ 
lead, are increasingly applying their laws extraterritorially to 
foreign nationals abroad in order to address transnational 
problems.1 This trend cuts across numerous areas of domestic 
statutory law.2 When it comes to applying the Constitution to 
noncitizens abroad, however, there is no clear trend.3 The 
 
 1. See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from 
Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 818– 20, 844– 56 (2009) (describing 
the rise of domestic and global extraterritoriality and arguing that this trend 
threatens sovereignty more than traditional sources of international law). 
 2. See id. at 848– 49 (mentioning numerous areas of law where 
extraterritorial application of United States law is on the rise, including, but 
not limited to, antitrust, securities, intellectual property, criminal, 
environmental, civil rights, and labor law). 
 3. See José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in 
the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J. 
1660, 1660 (2009) (explaining that even after two centuries of courts 
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Supreme Court has taken a case-by-case approach that defies 
generalization.4 Over the past century, in contexts ranging from 
“continental expansion, colonial administration, and 
conventional war” to the unconventional “war on terror,” the 
Court has utilized a variety of approaches to analyzing 
constitutional extraterritoriality questions, leaving lower courts 
with a complex patchwork of cases to try to apply to new 
situations.5  
Scholars have offered several possible theoretical 
justifications for extending constitutional protections to 
noncitizens abroad, including theories based on universalism, 
membership, mutuality of obligations, and “global due process.”6 
To date, however, the Court has not adopted a clear normative 
framework for analyzing the Constitution’s extraterritorial 
reach.7 Commentators have also debated whether the 
Constitution’s structural restraints on government (e.g. 
separation of power principles) apply globally, even if individual 
rights do not, and disputed whether distinctions can actually be 
drawn between “negative” and “positive” constitutional rights.8 
While some of the Court’s precedents implicitly indicate that 
 
considering whether the Constitution has extraterritorial force the law 
“remains unsettled, and no framework for analyzing these claims is clearly 
defined, much less well established”). 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See Cabranes, supra note 3, at 1664 (describing the approach taken 
by courts as “context-specific, tailored to the needs of the case, and sensitive 
to the practical limitations of enforcing a particular rule”). 
 6. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 
916– 20 (1991) (discussing universalist approaches, membership models, strict 
territoriality approaches, and global due process); Christina Duffy Burnett, 
Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 797, 797 (2005) (suggesting that the set of Supreme Court decisions 
known collectively as the Insular Cases installed a “doctrine of territorial 
deannexation in American constitutional jurisprudence”); see generally 
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 7. See Cabranes, supra note 3, at 1664 (“Instead [of using a clear 
framework,] the approach taken by [U.S.] courts, when confronted with 
requests to apply the Constitution to actions abroad (that is, 
‘extraterritorially’), is context-specific, tailored to the needs of the case, and 
sensitive to the practical limitations of enforcing a particular rule.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and 
the Constitution Abroad, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1651– 62 (2013) (discussing the 
theoretical justifications for distinguishing individual rights and separation of 
powers and arguing that the distinction is ultimately unconvincing). 
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structural limitations apply extraterritorially, it has never 
stated so explicitly, further adding to the confusion.9  
This Article focuses on an emerging body of 
extraterritoriality cases involving U.S.-Mexico border 
enforcement being decided against this complex legal backdrop. 
Recent shifts in border enforcement policies and practices raise 
pressing new questions about the extraterritorial reach of 
constitutional rights.10 Under the Trump Administration, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is part of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has adopted policies 
that (1) require asylum seekers to wait in Mexico for weeks or 
months before having an opportunity to apply for asylum;11 (2) 
force asylum seekers to return to Mexico while they are waiting 
for their court dates;12 and (3) aggressively use the expedited 
removal process, which treats individuals in the interior of the 
country as if they were at the border.13 Additionally, Border 
Patrol agents standing on United States soil have engaged in 
violent acts that harm individuals on the other side of the 
border, such as cross-border shootings14 and the use of tear gas 
on migrants.15 A critical legal question that arises in all of these 
 
 9. See id. at 1644 (explaining how the Court has assumed that basic 
structural limitations generally apply extraterritorially). 
 10. See, e.g., Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1220 
(S.D. Cal. 2019) (involving the organization Al Otro Lado and a group of 
individual asylum seekers challenging “metering” and related activities, 
which they describe as an illegal “Turnback Policy”). 
 11. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SPECIAL 
REVIEW— INITIAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING FAMILY SEPARATION ISSUES UNDER 
THE ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY 5–  6 (2018), https://perma.cc/HNU9-2J2P (PDF) 
[hereinafter OIG SPECIAL REVIEW] (explaining the “metering” policy). 
 12. Press Release, Migrant Prot. Protocols, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 
(Jan. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q26N-J4PA (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) [hereinafter MPP Press 
Release]. 
 13. Notice Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 
35,409 (July 23, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Designation]. 
 14. See, e.g., Hernández v. Mesa (Hernández II), 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 
2018) (en banc); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 15. See Jamil Dakwar, Government Use of Tear Gas is Illegal in War. It 
Should be Illegal Here, Too., ACLU (Nov. 28, 2018, 5:45 PM), 
https://perma.cc/6RX8-CH29 (last updated Jan. 2, 2018) (last visited Jan. 5, 
2020) (describing domestic lawsuits filed by the ACLU challenging the use of 
tear gas) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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situations is whether someone who is physically outside the 
United States, or who is legally treated as being outside the 
United States under immigration law, can invoke constitutional 
protections in United States courts.16 
Immigration policies pose a particularly tricky context for 
analyzing constitutional extraterritoriality issues because of 
their intersection with the political branches’ plenary power 
over immigration, which limits judicial review of immigration 
decisions.17 In fact, the Third Circuit described plenary power 
and extraterritoriality as “seemingly disparate, and perhaps 
even competing, constitutional fields,” struggling to “discern the 
manner in which . . . [they] interact.”18 One of the challenges in 
analyzing the interaction of these fields is that plenary power 
cases have traditionally treated physical presence in the United 
States as a trigger for constitutional rights to apply,19 whereas 
the Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence makes it 
clear that constitutional rights do not depend on territoriality.20 
This Article explores the extraterritorial reach of constitutional 
rights in this complicated context of border enforcement. 
Part II of the Article provides background information 
about border enforcement policies and practices that raise 
extraterritoriality issues. These include the policy of “metering” 
 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See, e.g., Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) 
(recognizing the political branches’ plenary authority to exclude aliens); 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (“It is not within 
the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been 
[naturalized, resided or admitted to the U.S.], shall be permitted to enter, in 
opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the [L]egislative and 
[E]xecutive [B]ranches of the national government.”); United States ex rel. 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (emphasizing that the power 
to admit or exclude an alien is inherently held by the Executive and 
Legislative Branches). 
 18. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 434 (3d Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017). 
 19. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (explaining the 
Court’s practice of granting an alien seeking initial admission to the United 
States “no constitutional rights regarding his application[,]” however, once an 
alien is physically in the country “and begins to develop the ties that go with 
permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly”). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265– 66 
(1990) (framing a “sufficient connections” approach to be used to determine 
individuals’ rights, as opposed to a strict territorial limit to constitutional 
rights). 
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asylum seekers at ports of entry;21 the “Remain in Mexico” policy 
implemented under the so-called “Migration Protection 
Protocols” that forces asylum seekers to return to Mexico;22 the 
expedited removal policy, which was recently expanded to apply 
throughout the entire United States;23 as well as policies and 
practices regarding the cross-border use of force.24 This Part 
explains how these policies and practices manipulate location in 
a way that deprives noncitizens of legal protections and raise 
challenging questions about what “extraterritoriality” means in 
unconventional situations, such as when a significant part of the 
action occurs in the United States. 
In order to analyze these complex questions, Part III 
explains the different approaches that the Supreme Court has 
used to determine the extraterritorial reach of constitutional 
rights. The two predominant approaches are the “substantial 
connections” test set forth in United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez,25 a case that involved a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to an extraterritorial search and seizure in Mexico,26 
and the “functional test” that the Supreme Court applied in 
Boumediene v. Bush,27 which held that Guantánamo Bay 
detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus.28 This 
discussion also addresses the “fundamental rights” approach, 
which was historically used to determine which constitutional 
 
 21. See OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 11, at 5–  6 (explaining the 
“metering” policy). 
 22. See MPP Press Release, supra note 12 (“The Migrant Protection 
Protocols (MPP) are a U.S. Government action whereby certain foreign 
individuals entering or seeking admission to the U.S. from Mexico—illegally 
or without proper documentation—may be returned to Mexico and wait 
outside of the U.S. for the duration of their immigration proceedings . . . .”). 
 23. See 2019 Designation, supra note 13, at 35,410 (designating new 
categories of aliens for expedited removal, including those encountered in a 
location more than 100 air miles from the border, and who have been 
continuously present in the United States for less than two years). 
 24. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter 
EO on Border Security]. 
 25. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 26. See id. at 271–  73 (explaining the substantial connections approach to 
the reach of individuals’ constitutional protections). 
 27. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 28. See id. at 764–65 (explaining the functional approach to the reach of 
individuals’ constitutional protections). 
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rights should apply to unincorporated United States territories 
after the Spanish-American War, and continues to implicitly 
influence decisions, including Boumediene.29 All of these 
approaches reject strict territoriality as a requirement for 
constitutional protections, turning on consideration of other 
factors. Part III then juxtaposes these approaches with plenary 
power cases that rely on territoriality as a trigger for 
constitutional rights, and examines exceptions to territoriality 
under the plenary power doctrine, raising questions about how 
these doctrines interact. 
Probing these issues further, Part IV examines several 
recent appellate and district court decisions that have 
addressed constitutional claims and extraterritoriality issues in 
the border enforcement context. These decisions involve 
constitutional challenges to cross-border shootings and 
expedited removal orders, both of which resulted in circuit 
splits, as well as a due process challenge to “metering” asylum 
seekers that is still being litigated in district court at the time 
of this writing. These decisions highlight significant disparities 
regarding the courts’ use of extraterritoriality tests, the role of 
the plenary power doctrine, and the relevance of separations of 
powers concerns, which help explain the circuit splits. 
Part V examines the discrepancies among these border 
enforcement cases in greater detail. The first section of Part V 
analyzes differences in the selection of extraterritoriality tests, 
as well as variations in how specific tests are applied. It also 
explores how implicit and explicit analyses of a right’s 
fundamental nature influenced the courts and contributed to 
the circuit splits. This section concludes with a proposal for a 
composite test that draws on Verdugo, Boumediene, and a 
fundamental rights approach. 
The second section of Part V identifies three different 
approaches to the plenary power doctrine that emerge from the 
cases. These involve applying the plenary power doctrine as a 
trump card; an implicit deference doctrine; or a doctrine subject 
to legislative constraints.  
The last section of Part V examines the relevance of 
separation of powers as a principle that guided the courts’ 
decisions. It explains the constitution’s textual ambiguity on 
extraterritoriality issues and the need for structural principles, 
 
 29. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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such as separation of powers, to act as a check on executive 
power. Since Boumediene presented separation of powers as an 
anti-manipulation principle, this Part explores two specific 
types of manipulation concerns that emerge from the cases: 
manipulation of the border as a legal construct and 
manipulation of national security as an illusory threat. 
The Article concludes that extending constitutional 
protections, preserving judicial review, and critically examining 
demands for deference are crucial in this context in order to 
avoid creating a law-free zone just beyond our southern border. 
II. Extraterritoriality Issues in Border Enforcement 
Shortly after Trump was elected President, he issued an 
Executive Order titled “Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements” that announced several policy 
changes, including expanding expedited removal and returning 
asylum seekers from contiguous countries to the country from 
which they approached the United States during removal 
proceedings.30 These proposals immediately raised due process 
concerns.31 Over the past couple of years, several of Trump’s 
 
 30. See EO on Border Security, supra note 24 at 8793 (articulating a 
policy of expediting “determinations of apprehended individuals’ claims of 
eligibility to remain in the United States”). A month after the Executive Order 
was issued, the Department of Homeland Security issued a memorandum 
clarifying certain vague aspects of the Executive Order. See Memorandum 
from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Implementing the President’s 
Border Sec. and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies (Feb. 20, 
2017), https://perma.cc/NXP4-8HE4 (PDF) (enumerating the expedited 
removal process and implementing the return process). 
 31. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 
“BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS” 1 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/8L6A-UQUS (PDF) (“Overall, the provisions in the 
[executive] order pose serious concerns for the protection and due process 
rights of those currently residing in the United States, communities along the 
U.S-Mexico border, and vulnerable populations seeking protection in the 
country.”); Increased Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Executive 
Order and DHS Memo: Frequently Asked Questions, CATHOLIC LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/SG3T-6TXK (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2019) (“If these directives succeed, detention will be expanded, 
deportations accelerated at the expense of due process, and criminal penalties 
for immigration offenses increased.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF 
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proposed border enforcement policies have been implemented.32 
This Part explains the policies with extraterritorial 
implications, including those that keep asylum seekers in 
Mexico, expand expedited removal, and encourage cross-border 
uses of force.  
A. Policies to Keep Asylum Seekers in Mexico 
The Trump Administration has implemented multiple 
policies designed to keep asylum seekers outside the United 
States. One of these is “metering,” which requires asylum 
seekers to wait in Mexico for weeks or months before having an 
opportunity to apply.33 Another is called “Remain in Mexico,” 
and forces non-Mexican asylum seekers to return to Mexico 
after passing a credible fear interview and being placed in 
removal proceedings.34 
1. “Metering” Asylum Seekers at Ports of Entry 
“Metering” refers to the practice of requiring asylum 
seekers to wait along the border in Mexico before they can apply 
for asylum in the United States.35 A version of metering dates 
back to 2016, when the Obama Administration began using it to 
regulate the flow of individuals at certain ports of entry, but its 
 
EXECUTIVE ORDER “BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
IMPROVEMENTS,” 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/L4BJ-FFZQ (PDF) (“[V]ulnerable 
people will almost certainly be sent back to dangerous, possibly 
life- threatening circumstances, without the opportunity to seek legal 
protection consistent with due process.”). 
 32. See, e.g., MPP Press Release, supra note 12 (detailing the Migrant 
Protection Protocols which involve asylum seekers returning to Mexico while 
they await their court date); 2019 Designation, supra note 13 (detailing the 
use of an expedited removal process that treats individuals in the interior of 
the country as if they were at the border). 
 33. See OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 11, at 5–  6 (explaining that once 
the processing facilities at the port of entry are at capacity, asylum seekers 
must wait outside the United States, often in Mexico, for an opening at the 
facility to begin their processing). 
 34. See MPP Press Release, supra note 12 (detailing how the “Remain in 
Mexico” policy changes will operate). 
 35. OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 11, at 5– 6. 
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use was very limited and not widely known.36 In Spring 2018, 
the Trump Administration publicly announced the “metering” 
process, suggesting that it was a way to deal with the legal 
“loophole” of asylum.37  
A September 2018 report by the Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) described “metering” in more detail.38 OIG 
explained that, when metering, CBP officers stand at the 
international line in the middle of the “pedestrian footbridges 
[that] link the United States and Mexico,” and only allow 
noncitizens to cross the line if “space is available” to hold them 
in the port of entry.39 When the ports are “full,” CBP officers 
inform the asylum seekers that they will be allowed to enter 
later, once there is “sufficient space and resources to process 
 
 36. See id. at 6 n.11 (explaining that CBP officials informed the OIG team 
that CBP has used metering since 2016 to “address safety and health hazards 
that resulted from overcrowding at ports of entry”); see also Facing Walls: USA 
and Mexico’s Violations of the Rights of Asylum-Seekers, AMNESTY INT’L (June 
15, 2017), https://perma.cc/XHH9-X7SC (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (stating 
that CBP officials are illegally refusing entry to asylum- seekers at ports of 
entry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Richard Gonzalez, 
Advocates Say Agents Are Unlawfully Turning Away Asylum Seekers at the 
Border, NPR (July 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/G6U3-5FET (last visited Dec. 
23, 2019) (emphasizing that the Trump Administration has imposed stricter 
controls on the asylum process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, ‘No Asylum Here’: Some Say 
U.S. Border Agents Rejected Them, NY TIMES (May 3, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/YZ2F-UGBK (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (“Customs agents 
have increasingly turned away asylum seekers without so much as an 
interview.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Aaron Nelsen, 
U.S. Officials Sending Asylum Seekers Back to Mexico, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, https://perma.cc/32HX-Z9XR (last updated Dec. 16, 2019) (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2019) (noting the massive influx of asylum seekers along the 
Southwest border in 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. See Rebekah Entralgo, U.S. is Violating Human Rights, Lying About 
How Asylum Seekers Are Treated at Border, Per New Report, THINK PROGRESS 
(Oct. 11, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://perma.cc/JH4Y-S7NM (quoting Secretary of 
Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen); see also U.S. Customs & Border 
Protection, Statement from Commissioner Kevin McAleenan on Operations at 
San Ysidro Port of Entry (Apr. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/28GQ-VEWN (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2019) (“[I]ndividuals [without appropriate documentation] 
may need to wait in Mexico as CBP officers work to process those already 
within our facilities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 38. OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 11, at 5– 6. 
 39. Id. at 6. 
762 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2020) 
them.”40 However, the OIG team “did not observe severe 
overcrowding at the ports of entry [when] it visited.”41 In 
private, DHS informed Congress that the real purpose of 
metering was to deter asylum seekers, because “[t]he more we 
process, the more will come.”42 
The practice of “metering” has resulted in wait times that 
range from two weeks to six months at various ports of entry.43 
During that time, asylum seekers are placed on a “waitlist,” but 
confusion, lack of transparency, and corruption plague the 
process.44 At some ports of entry, asylum seekers themselves 
have created a waitlist.45 At others, officials from the Mexican 
National Migration Institute, Mexican security agents, or even 
cartel members have become managers of waiting lists.46 A 
study reported nearly 19,000 asylum seekers on waitlists in 
May 2019.47 Corruption is rampant in this haphazard system, 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 7. 
 42. See Letter from Representatives Jerrold Nadler, Bennie Thompson, 
and Zoe Lofgren, U.S. House of Representatives, to Comm’r Kevin McAleenan, 
U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Dec. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/F43F-Q8PB 
(PDF) (citing a statement by Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of 
Intelligence, Jed Murdock during a briefing about the decision to limit 
processing to 100 asylum seekers per day at the San Ysidro Port of Entry).  
 43. ROBERT STRAUSS CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. & LAW AT THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT 
AUSTIN & THE CTR. FOR U.S.- MEX. STUDIES AT THE UNIV. CAL. SAN DIEGO SCH. 
OF GLOB. POLICY & STRATEGY, METERING UPDATE 2–  3 (Feb. 2019) [hereinafter 
METERING UPDATE], https://perma.cc/7TS2-2SGK (PDF). 
 44. See Elliot Spagat et al., For Thousands of Asylum Seekers, All They 
Can Do is Wait, AP NEWS (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/PFZ8-K5JE (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2019) (describing migrants being attacked by cartels, sold fake 
waitlist wristbands, and facing extortion by corrupt officials) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. See id. (explaining how an asylum seeker from Venezuela, Darwin 
Mora, currently manages a waitlist of 900 people on a whiteboard while he 
waits in Mexico for his turn to attempt to seek asylum). 
 46. See id. (detailing how a migrant shelter in Juarez, Mexico, created a 
waitlist system by writing numbers on asylum seekers’ arms in black ink); see 
also HARVARD IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM, REQUEST FOR 
THEMATIC HEARING (MEXICO) ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION OF ASYLUM 
SEEKERS AT THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER SUBMITTED TO THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (July 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/6UUE-
GXN9 (PDF). 
 47. METERING UPDATE, supra note 43, at 2; see also Savitri Arvey, 
Thousands of Asylum-Seekers Left Waiting at the US-Mexico Border, PRI 
(June 17, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/VS8L-Q59M (last visited Dec. 23, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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as waitlist managers often take bribes or charge asylum seekers 
money to call their numbers or place them on a separate 
“expedited” list.48  
While waiting in Mexico, asylum seekers face significant 
dangers, including kidnapping, trafficking, physical and sexual 
assaults, murders, threats, theft, and extortion.49 Being forced 
to wait in Mexico also impedes their ability to obtain legal 
information about the asylum process and find attorneys to 
assist them.50 Additionally, the “metering” process can lead to 
family separation if not all family members are allowed to enter 
the United States at the same time.51 
In 2017, the organization Al Otro Lado and other plaintiffs 
filed a lawsuit challenging what they describe as an illegal 
“Turnback Policy.”52 The lawsuit alleges not only the metering 
practices described above, but deliberate attempts to prevent 
asylum seekers from applying through tactics that include 
threats, intimidation, coercion, and verbal as well as physical 
 
 48. See Spagat, supra note 44 (“There are frequent allegations that 
Mexican government officials or security agents demand bribes to let people 
join the list or move up the list.”); see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BARRED AT THE 
BORDER: WAIT “LISTS” LEAVE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN PERIL AT TEXAS PORTS OF 
ENTRY 7 (Apr. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/2FKU-KLQ9 (PDF) (reporting 
allegations in multiple cities where private individuals, acting on behalf of the 
municipality, extorted funds from asylum seekers to join “expedited” lists). 
 49. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 48, at 2; HEIDI ALTMAN, SYSTEMIC 
RIGHTS ABUSES ON THE BORDER: THE REAL PROBLEMS AND WHAT WILL FIX THEM 
1 (July 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/625K-UJK6 (PDF). 
 50. See Lorelei Laird, Strangers in a Strange Land: “Metering” Makes 
Asylum Rights Meaningless, Immigrant Advocates Say, A.B.A. J. (July 24, 
2019, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/3XR3-XWSQ (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) 
(“[M]etering has created further barriers of all kinds in the legal process, 
including barriers to finding a pro bono lawyer, to those lawyers’ ability to 
provide effective representation and even to notifying the immigrants of their 
hearings.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Altman, supra 
note 49 (explaining how those awaiting their court dates in Mexican cities do 
not have access to U.S. attorneys or legal aid services). 
 51. See Spagat, supra note 44 (noting that teenagers and single adults 
pass through far more quickly than families due to the lack of schedule of how 
many people are admitted each day, making it hard for families to fit into the 
varying quotas). 
 52. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Al 
Otro Lado, Inc., v. Nielsen, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 
2018). 
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abuse.53 In addition to various statutory claims under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), and Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the lawsuit 
alleges violations of procedural due process.54 In July 2019, the 
district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss most of 
the statutory claims, as well as the due process claim.55 This 
decision addressed extraterritoriality issues, as discussed in 
Part IV below. 
2. The “Remain in Mexico” Policy 
The Trump Administration has also adopted a policy that 
involves returning non-Mexican asylum seekers who have 
passed credible fear interviews to Mexico to wait there for their 
court hearings. This “Remain in Mexico” policy was part of the 
so-called “Migrant Protection Protocols” (MPP) announced in 
December 2018 and implemented on January 28, 2019.56 
The DHS first piloted the MPP at the San Ysidro port of 
entry on the San Diego-Tijuana border and then expanded it to 
El Paso-Juarez and Calexico-Mexicali.57 In June 2019, after the 
United States threatened to impose punitive tariffs on Mexico, 
the governments reached a deal that expanded the policy along 
the entire Southwest border.58  
The policy is now applied to people who present themselves 
at ports of entry, as well as those who enter illegally between 
ports of entry, and to families as well as single adults, although 
 
 53. See id. at 1 (alleging the types of unlawful conduct the CBP uses to 
deny asylum seekers access to the appropriate asylum process). 
 54. See id. at 81–  82 (arguing that constitutional due process rights are 
particularly important as applied to asylum seekers as wrongly denied asylum 
can have fatal consequences for the applicant). 
 55. Order Granting in Part & Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, No. 
3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2019), ECF No. 192 [hereinafter 
Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss]. 
 56. MPP Press Release, supra note 12. 
 57. See Tanvi Misra, An Expanded “Remain in Mexico” Policy May Cause 
More Suffering, Not Curb Migration, ROLL CALL, (June 10, 2019, 11:59 AM), 
https://perma.cc/HKY8-EAGR (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (noting that within 
the first six weeks, the MPP had affected over 10,000 asylum seekers across 
several cities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 58. See id. (explaining how President Trump threatened the Mexican 
government with tariffs unless Mexico agreed to do more to “curb the arrival 
of migrants from Central American and elsewhere to the U.S.- Mexico border”). 
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it is not applied to unaccompanied minors.59 By July 2019, over 
15,000 asylum seekers were sent back to Mexico under the 
MPP.60 The policy has put enormous pressure on nonprofit 
organizations in Mexico that assist migrants.61 Because the 
shelters are full, asylum seekers, including women and children, 
have been forced to live on the streets and in camps in northern 
Mexico, where they are exposed to many forms of violence.62 
Like “metering,” the “Remain in Mexico” policy can cause family 
separations when some members of the family are detained or 
released in the United States and others are returned to 
Mexico.63 
The legal authority on which DHS bases the “Remain in 
Mexico” policy is a provision of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act that states certain individuals “arriving on land . . . from a 
foreign territory contiguous to the United States” may be 
returned “to that territory pending a [removal] proceeding 
 
 59. See John Burnett, “I Want to Be Sure My Son is Safe:” Asylum-Seekers 
Send Children Across Border Alone, NPR (Nov. 27, 2019, 3:41 PM), 
https://perma.cc/4M76-RC4Y (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (describing that 
adults and families who apply for asylum together are sent back to wait in 
Mexico, however unaccompanied minors cannot be returned to Mexico) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 60. See Joel Rose, Migrant Caregivers Separated from Children at 
Border, Sent Back to Mexico, NPR (July 5, 2019, 5:16 AM), 
https://perma.cc/FEF3-29RU (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (noting additionally 
that two out of three cases are denied, on average, and the applicants sent 
back to their country of origin) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 61. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEXICO’S IMMIGRATION CONTROL EFFORTS 
(June 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/HE38-EBW2 (PDF) (stating that Mexico’s 
Commission for the Aid of Refugees lacks the budget or staff to process 
pending and new asylum claims). 
 62. See WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, CHAOS, CONFUSION, AND DANGER: THE 
REMAIN IN MEXICO PROGRAM IN EL PASO 2 (April 23– 26, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/36ZM-PM77 (PDF) (describing how shelters reaching 
capacity in Ciudad Juarez have forced migrant families to live on the 
dangerous streets). 
 63.  See Joel Rose & Laura Smitherman, Fear, Confusion and Separation 
as Trump Administration Sends Migrants Back to Mexico, NPR (July 1, 2019, 
2:35 PM), https://perma.cc/33AK-AHFU (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (citing 
immigration lawyers’ concerns about the increase in family separations 
occurring under the new policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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under Section 1229a.”64 Since its enactment in 1996, that 
provision has never before been implemented by the United 
States government in a systematic way.65 Previously, these 
individuals would have remained in the United States pending 
their proceedings.66  
The DHS has stated in an official memorandum that the 
“Remain in Mexico” policy shall be implemented “consistent 
with the non-refoulement principles” contained in the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
Convention Against Torture, which prohibit returning someone 
to a country where they risk being persecuted or tortured.67 The 
procedure that the government has created to accomplish this is 
a single interview by an asylum officer.68 That officer must 
decide whether an individual is “more likely than not” to face 
persecution or torture in Mexico.69 That is the ultimate legal 
standard for withholding of removal, and normally it is an 
immigration judge who makes that determination at the end of 
 
 64. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) (2018). 
 65. See Press Release, Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielson Announces Historic 
Action to Confront Illegal Immigration, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Dec. 20, 
2018), https://perma.cc/6HMU-LSJM (last visited Dec. 24, 2019) (emphasizing 
the historic change to “begin the process of invoking” the provision) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 66. See id. (stating that under the MPP, “‘catch and release’ will be 
replaced with ‘catch and return,’” where “release” refers to the past practice of 
allowing asylum seekers to remain in the United States while awaiting their 
court hearing). 
 67. See Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols, 
to L. Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., Kevin K. 
McAleenan, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Ronald D. Vitiello, Deputy 
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Jan. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc
/R4EM-RCWK (PDF) (forbidding return “if an alien would more likely than 
not be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion”). 
 68. See Andrew Patterson, Asylum Officers: Remain in Mexico Policy 
“Virtually Guarantees” Unlawful Removal of Asylum Seekers, LAWFARE BLOG 
(June 28, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://perma.cc/9RNX-HETR (last visited Dec. 24, 
2019) (arguing that the standard of proof that applies in credible-fear 
interviews is inappropriately high and all but ensures violation of the 
non-refoulement obligation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 69. Id. 
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a full evidentiary hearing, not an asylum officer at an initial 
interview.70  
Furthermore, the DHS does not notify asylum seekers that 
they will be sent back to Mexico and does not ask them if they 
fear being sent there.71 Many asylum seekers from other 
countries therefore do not know to state a fear of being sent to 
Mexico, even if they are afraid to go there.72 When someone does 
state a fear of returning to Mexico, the interview with the 
asylum officer is often scheduled within days, which does not 
provide the individual time to find a lawyer, gather evidence, or 
learn about the legal process.73 There is no right to appeal the 
asylum officer’s decision to an immigration judge or the Board 
of Immigration Appeals.74 This process offers far fewer 
protections than the ordinary credible fear assessment for 
asylum.75  
 
 70. See id. (stating that the “more likely than not” standard is usually 
used in full evidentiary hearings in immigration court where the asylum 
seeker has retained legal counsel, had the opportunity to gather evidence, and 
may present witnesses). 
 71. See Maria Sacchetti, U.S. Asylum Officers Say Trump’s “Remain in 
Mexico” Policy is Threatening Migrants’ Lives, Ask Federal Court to End It, 
WASH. POST (June 27, 2019, 10:58 AM), https://perma.cc/SVR4-J2R7 (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2019) (reporting that many asylum officers fear that MPP is 
sending asylum seekers back to Mexico without first ensuring they do not fear 
persecution or torture there) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 72. See Brief for National CIS Council 119 as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellees at 17, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 
2019) (No. 19-16487) (explaining that most asylum seekers to whom the MPP 
applies are unlikely to spontaneously mention a fear of persecution in Mexico 
and emphasizing that, without this unprovoked expression of fear, 
immigration agents do not make inquiries about the risk of refoulement). 
 73. See id. at 19 (stating that the fact the asylum seeker is not provided 
time to prepare with counsel before the assessment is especially problematic 
because asylum seekers are unaware if they will face persecution should they 
be returned to Mexico because they merely passed through en route to the 
United States). 
 74. See id. at 19 (characterizing the asylum officer’s determination as 
unreviewable by an immigration judge). 
 75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(b) (2018) (explaining the regular asylum 
process, which uses the lower “credible fear” standard to evaluate if an asylum 
seeker has a valid asylum claim and can therefore move on to plead their case 
in a full evidentiary hearing). 
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In addition to these procedural inadequacies related to 
assessing the risk of persecution or torture in Mexico, the 
“Remain in Mexico” policy threatens to deprive individuals of 
procedural rights in their removal proceedings, where an 
immigration judge must determine if they should be deported to 
their home country.76 Being in Mexico makes it much harder for 
asylum seekers to find and remain in contact with their legal 
representatives during their removal proceedings.77 Those 
staying in shelters have limited phone access, making it difficult 
to communicate with legal service providers in the United 
States.78 Additionally, being in Mexico may make it more 
difficult for asylum seekers to receive hearing notices regarding 
court dates, which could result in in absentia orders of 
deportation if a hearing is missed.79 When returned individuals 
finally do get their asylum hearings before an immigration 
judge, the hearings are often conducted by video with 
inadequate interpretation.80 In south Texas, for instance, 
hearings have taken place by video in “makeshift tent courts.”81  
In 2019, the Innovation Law Lab and other plaintiffs filed 
a federal lawsuit challenging the “Remain in Mexico” policy on 
statutory grounds, but it did not allege any constitutional 
 
 76. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Maria Benevento, El Paso Stats Support Concerns About “Remain 
in Mexico” Plan, NAT’L CATH. REP. (May 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/38VY-
XDHV (last visited Dec. 24, 2019) (reporting the percentage of migrants with 
legal representation in the Remain in Mexico program to be around thirteen 
percent in May 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 78. See id. (reporting on the situation of the 2,800 asylum seekers from 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador who had been returned to Ciudad 
Juarez, Mexico in May 2019). 
 79. See Spagat, supra note 44 (quoting migrants waiting in Mexicali, 
Mexico who received anywhere from a day’s notice to a half-hour warning: “If 
you’re not ready, you lose your turn. You always have to have your telephone 
in reach”). 
 80. See Open Letter to Inter- Am. Comm’n for Human Rights, Request for 
Comprehensive in Loco Visit to the United States and Mexico to Consider 
Human Rights Violations Impacting Migrants and Request for Ongoing 
Robust Monitoring of the Regional Human Rights Situation Relating to 
Migrants 5 (July 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/PLK8-GCDR (PDF) (noting the 
new United States policy of removing in-person court interpreters and instead 
relying on limited use of telephonic interpretation). 
 81. Id. 
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violations.82 On May 7, 2019, the Ninth Circuit stayed a 
preliminary injunction that the lower court had granted, 
thereby allowing the policy to go into effect while the litigation 
continued.83 The Ninth Circuit’s decision found that the 
plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their statutory claims 
under the INA and APA, making it even more important to 
consider potential due process claims.84  
A subsequent decision by a different panel of the Ninth 
Circuit held that the administration was exceeding its statutory 
authority in implementing the policy,85 but the court stayed its 
holding outside the Ninth Circuit.86 The Supreme Court, in a 
three-sentence decision, upheld the stay, leaving the “Remain in 
Mexico” policy in effect at the time of this writing.87 The 
plaintiffs in the current case are not individuals who were 
returned to Mexico.88 However, if returned individuals seek to 
challenge the “Remain in Mexico” policy on due process grounds, 
courts will need to address extraterritorial issues in considering 
those constitutional claims.89 
B. Expedited Removal and Its Expansion 
President Trump’s 2017 Executive Order on Border 
Enforcement also directed the DHS to increase the use of 
 
 82. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 31– 36, 
Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 
3:19-cv-00807-RS) (enumerating claims for relief based on various statutory 
grounds). 
 83. See Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 
2019) (invalidating the preliminary injunction by granting a motion for a stay 
pending appeal). 
 84. See id. (stating that the preliminary injunction, in its present form, is 
unlikely to be sustained on appeal). 
 85. Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 86. Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 87. Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, No. 19A960, 2020 WL 1161432, at *1 
(U.S. Mar. 11, 2020) (mem.). 
 88. See Brief for Local 1924 as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiff- Appellees’ Answering Brief & Affirmance of the District Court’s 
Decision at i, Innovation Law Lab, 924 F.3d (No.19-15716) (listing out the 
remaining Appellees as consisting only of organizations that provide 
asylum- related legal services). 
 89. See infra Part III. 
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expedited removal.90 Under the INA, the Secretary of DHS may 
designate for expedited removal “any or all aliens” who have 
“not been admitted or paroled into the United States” (i.e. who 
entered without valid documents or through fraud or 
misrepresentation) and who have been “physically present in 
the United States continuously” for less than two years.91 For 
the past fifteen years, the designated class of noncitizens subject 
to expedited removal included those who had not been legally 
admitted, were apprehended within 100 miles of the border, and 
could not establish fourteen days of continuous physical 
presence in the United States.92  
In an expedited removal case, the DHS swiftly removes 
noncitizens without further review or any court hearing.93 There 
is only one exception: if the noncitizen expresses a fear of 
persecution or torture during an initial interview with a CBP 
officer.94 In that situation, CBP must refer the individual to an 
asylum officer for a credible fear interview.95 If the asylum 
officer finds no credible fear of persecution, then the noncitizen 
is promptly removed.96 If the officer finds a credible fear, the 
 
 90. See Kelly, supra note 30, at 5– 7 (expanding expedited removal 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2018) to new classes of migrants). 
 91. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2018). 
 92. See Notice Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 
48,877, 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter “2004 Designation”] (classifying as 
eligible for expedited removal only aliens who are encountered within 100 
miles of the border and cannot establish their continuous presence in the 
country for more than fourteen days). 
 93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (explaining that if an officer 
“determines an alien does not have credible fear of persecution” they have full 
authority to order the alien’s removal from the United States “without further 
hearing or review”). 
 94. Id. (creating an exception to expedited removal if the individual 
indicates either “an intention to apply for asylum” or a “fear of prosecution”). 
 95. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring immigration officers to refer 
those aliens seeking asylum or claiming fear of persecution to an asylum 
officer for interviewing). 
 96. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (“[I]f the officer determines that an alien 
does not have a credible fear of persecution, the officer shall order the alien 
removed from the United States without further hearing or review.”); see also 
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d) (2019) (setting forth the asylum officer’s interview protocol 
for determining whether a “credible fear” exists). 
EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS 771 
 
person is placed in full removal proceedings that take place 
before an immigration judge.97  
Expedited removal proceedings not only limit the right to a 
hearing, but also the right to judicial review.98 Specifically, the 
INA provides that an individual in expedited removal 
proceedings may file a habeas petition in federal district court 
to contest only three, limited determinations: whether the 
person is a noncitizen, whether the person “was ordered 
removed” via expedited removal, and whether the person is a 
permanent resident or has another lawful status exempting him 
or her from expedited removal.99 Review of whether someone 
“was ordered removed” is limited to whether such an order was 
in fact issued and whether it relates to the petitioner.100  
A court may not review “whether the alien is actually 
inadmissible or entitled to any form of relief from removal.”101 
The only possible way to obtain judicial review of such issues 
would be through a constitutional challenge.102 However, a 
circuit split has emerged regarding whether noncitizens may 
challenge an expedited removal order through habeas corpus.103 
As explained in Part IV below, this issue raises 
extraterritoriality issues because some courts have decided to 
treat individuals in expedited removal proceedings as if they 
 
 97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (noting that referred aliens “shall be 
detained for further consideration of the application for asylum”); see also 8 
C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (establishing that a “credible fear” finding triggers issuance 
of “a Form I–863, Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge”); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B) (2019) (“If the immigration judge finds that the alien, 
other than an alien stowaway, possesses a credible fear of persecution or 
torture, the immigration judge shall vacate the order of the asylum 
officer . . . .”). 
 98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (limiting judicial review to three narrow 
determinations). 
 99. See id. § 1252(e)(2)(A)–(C) (explaining the curtailment of traditional 
habeas corpus proceedings in this context). 
 100. See id. § 1252(e)(5) (“[T]he court’s inquiry shall be limited to whether 
such an order in fact was issued and whether it relates to the petitioner.”). 
 101. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. §1003.42(f) (2019) (“No appeal shall lie from a 
review of an adverse credible fear determination made by an immigration 
judge.”). 
 102. See infra Part III.B. 
 103. See infra Part IV.B. 
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were standing at the border, even though they were 
apprehended after entering the United States.104 
On July 22, 2019, the DHS issued a notice announcing that 
it was expanding expedited removal to apply to noncitizens 
apprehended anywhere in the United States who entered 
without documents or through fraud or misrepresentation and 
have not been continuously physically present in the country for 
at least two years.105 The change became effective the very next 
day.106 Thus, the new policy eliminates the geographic 
restriction on expedited removal altogether and dramatically 
increases the period of physical presence during which it is 
allowed for individuals who enter by land.  
As a result of this change, an estimated 328,000 more 
people will be vulnerable to expedited removal.107 Even 
individuals apprehended in the interior of the country who have 
established families, businesses, and homes in the United 
States may be subjected to speedy deportations without a court 
hearing.108 The dramatic expansion of expedited removal makes 
the issue of whether an expedited removal order may be 
constitutionally challenged all the more urgent. 
C. Cross-Border Uses of Force 
While the 2017 Executive Order on Border Enforcement did 
not announce any new policies regarding the use of force, it 
described illegal immigration to the United States as “a 
significant threat to national security and public safety,” one 
that “presents a clear and present danger to the interests of the 
United States.”109 The order emphasized the operations of 
 
 104. See infra Part IV.B. 
 105. See 2019 Designation, supra note 13, at 35,410 (noting that DHS 
asserted the policy change did not require notice-and-comment rulemaking 
but nevertheless accepted comments for sixty days after July 23, 2019). 
 106. See id. (“This Notice, including the New Designation, is effective on 
July 23, 2019.”). 
 107. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, EXPANDED EXPEDITED REMOVAL 2 
(2019), https://perma.cc/CXN7-867M (PDF) (“The regulation potentially exposes 
more than 328,000 additional people to expedited removal, limiting their 
access to immigration hearings and to due process generally.”). 
 108. See 2019 Designation, supra note 13, at 35,410 (permitting the speedy 
deportation of even the most established individuals so long as they have not 
been in the United States for more than two years). 
 109. EO on Border Security, supra note 24, at 8,793. 
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transnational criminal organizations and stated that “[a]mong 
those who illegally enter are those who seek to harm Americans 
through acts of terror or criminal conduct.”110 This rhetoric 
characterizing border enforcement as a national security issue 
affects decisions regarding the use of force.111 
Of course, the use of force by CBP officers in deterring 
migrants from entering the United States is not new; on the 
contrary, it is a longstanding issue.112 Even under the Obama 
Administration, the DOJ had a poor track record of pursuing 
criminal or civil charges in such cases.113 According to a 
December 2013 report, the DOJ was “not able to show any cases 
in which it recommended civil or criminal charges against a 
CBP agent or officer who killed in the line of duty in at least the 
past six years.”114 Due to numerous incidents involving the 
lethal use of force by CBP officers under the Obama 
Administration, the agency reviewed its use of use-of-force 
policy and issued a revised version in 2014.115 That revised 
policy requires force to be “objectively reasonable,” prohibits 
“excessive force,” and permits “deadly force” only when there is 
“reasonable belief” that an individual “poses an imminent 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. See KATHRYN HAMPTON, ZERO PROTECTION: HOW U.S. BORDER 
ENFORCEMENT HARMS MIGRANT SAFETY AND HEALTH 6–7 (2019), https://
perma.cc/NCB6-DY7G (PDF) (describing the ways in which increased 
militarization of the United States Border Patrol agency had adversely 
effected migrants’ physical safety). 
 112. See Bob Ortega & Rob O’Dell, Deadly Border Agent Incidents Cloaked 
in Silence, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 28, 2014, 11:06 AM) https://perma.cc/JN8J-
DEXL (last updated Mar. 28, 2014, 1:51 PM) (last visited Jan. 4, 2020) (noting 
that Border Patrol agents have faced few repercussions for illegitimate use of 
deadly force since at least the early 2000s) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 113. See id. (noting that this period of relative immunity persisted even 
during the Obama administration). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT. 
USE OF FORCE REVIEW: CASES AND POLICIES 2–3 (2013), https://perma.cc/HZ5N-
HDEE (PDF) (recommending substantive changes to departmental policies, 
including on use of force); see also DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., CBP USE OF FORCE TRAINING AND ACTIONS TO ADDRESS USE OF 
FORCE INCIDENTS (REDACTED) 8–11 (2013), https://perma.cc/3E89-DPBZ (PDF) 
(recommending substantive changes to U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
use of force policy). 
774 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2020) 
danger of death or serious bodily injury” to the officer or another 
person.116  
Although concerns regarding the use of force are not new, 
the Trump Administration has made certain novel and highly 
controversial decisions regarding the use of force that reflect the 
notion that illegal immigration poses an urgent threat to 
national security.117 For example, on November 1, 2018, 
President Trump deployed 5,900 active-duty military troops and 
2,100 National Guard forces to the U.S.-Mexico border to 
“defend” CBP officers from an approaching caravan of 
migrants.118 The White House specifically authorized these 
military troops to use force, “including lethal force where 
necessary.”119 Such widespread authorization for thousands of 
military troops to use force in the defense of border patrol agents 
on United States soil was unprecedented.120 Trump also told the 
troops to treat any migrants throwing rocks as if they had a 
firearm, which would violate CBP’s own use-of-force policy, but 
he later backed down from that position.121  
 
 116. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT. OFFICE OF TRAINING AND DEV., USE 
OF FORCE POLICY, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 1 (2014), https://
perma.cc/6MRJ-KSQQ (PDF). 
 117. While incidents involving the use of force have generally decreased 
since 2013, the raw numbers remain high, involving over 900 singular uses of 
force in FY 2018 related to firearms, “less-lethal devices,” such as batons, 
electronic control weapons, and the PepperBall Launching System, and force 
against vehicles or vessels. See CBP Use of Force Statistics Fiscal Year 2018, 
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://perma.cc/AQ7C-2PLA (last 
modified Mar. 5, 2019) (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (recording 913 such uses of 
force in Fiscal Year 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 118. See Tara Copp, White House Approves Use of Force, Some Law 
Enforcement Roles for Border Troops, MILITARY TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://
perma.cc/5CYR-G639 (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“The White House late 
Tuesday signed a memo allowing troops stationed at the border to engage in 
some law enforcement roles and use lethal force, if necessary . . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. (“Military forces always have the inherent right to self defense, 
but defense of the border agents on U.S. soil is new.”). 
 121. See Ted Hessen, Rebecca Morin & Andrew Restuccia, ‘Consider It a 
Rifle:’ Trump Says Migrants Throwing Rocks Will Be Treated as Armed, 
POLITICO (Nov. 1, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://perma.cc/CP6Y-UMBZ (last 
updated Nov. 1, 2018) (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“The [CBP] handbook says 
agents should not discharge firearms in response to thrown or launched 
projectiles unless the agent has reason to believe the subject ‘poses an 
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Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 2018, CBP officers 
used tear gas on a crowd of migrants that included women and 
children after a group rushed towards the border fence in 
Tijuana.122 Many of the migrants intended to seek asylum in the 
United States.123 Trump downplayed the harm caused by the 
tear gas, describing it as “very safe.”124 But, a picture of a woman 
with two distressed children in diapers trying to escape the tear 
gas that was circulated widely online gave a very different 
impression.125  
On January 1, 2019, CBP officers again used tear gas and 
pepper spray on a crowd of migrants in Tijuana.126 While CBP 
alleged that it used the tear gas after some officers were hit by 
rocks, journalists reported seeing rock-throwing by migrants 
only after the tear gas was deployed.127 Mexico demanded a 
thorough investigation of these two incidents, describing tear 
gas as a “non-lethal weapon” that was launched into Mexico.128 
 
imminent danger of serious physical injury or death’ to the agent or another 
person.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 122. See Maya Averbuch & Elisabeth Malkin, Migrants in Tijuana Run to 
U.S. Border, but Fall Back in Face of Tear Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/DG4M-59W8 (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“[T]he United States 
Customs and Border Protection agency shut down the border crossing in both 
directions and fired tear gas to push back migrants from the border fence.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 123. See id. (“The backlog of people waiting to request asylum at a 
checkpoint has swelled . . . .”). 
 124. Migrant Caravan: Trump Defends Tear Gas on Mexico Border, BBC 
NEWS (Nov. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/F8KE-VR6K (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 125. See id. (“However, this was disputed by some journalists at the scene, 
who said the tear gas was painful even from a significant distance away.”). 
 126. See Paulina Villegas & Alan Yuhas, Mexico Calls on U.S. to 
Investigate Use of Tear Gas at Border, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), https://
perma.cc/573J-FN3P (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“Mexico has asked the United 
States for an investigation into American border officers’ actions along the 
nations’ shared border, two days after agents near San Diego used tear gas, 
smoke and pepper spray to repel a group of migrants trying to cross into the 
United States.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 127. See id. (“The Associated Press reported that women, children and 
journalists were affected by the tear gas, and that its journalists saw rocks 
thrown only after the tear gas was launched.”). 
 128. See id. (noting that “Mexico has asked the United States for an 
investigation into American border officers’ actions” after the tear gas 
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Organizations, including the ACLU and Amnesty International, 
criticized these indiscriminate uses of tear gas as 
disproportionate.129 
Under the Constitution, an excessive force claim is 
normally brought under the Fourth Amendment, but it may also 
be brought under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause in 
situations where the Fourth Amendment does not provide 
protection.130 Lawsuits have challenged the domestic use of tear 
gas by law enforcement officers in various situations as 
violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.131 Although 
lawsuits were not filed challenging the cross-border uses of tear 
gas described above, at least two cases involving cross-border 
shootings of Mexican teenagers have been litigated in the 
appellate courts, resulting in a circuit split.132 Those cases are 
discussed in Part IV below and raise challenging 
extraterritoriality issues because they involved United States 
 
incident); see also Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Administration Official Defends 
Tear Gas Use at Mexico Border, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2018, 11:39 AM), https://
perma.cc/XPP8-YYWN (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“A day after the incident, 
Mexico’s foreign ministry presented a diplomatic note to the U.S. government 
calling for ‘a full investigation’ into what it described as non-lethal weapons 
directed toward Mexican territory.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 129. See Megan Specia & Rick Gladstone, Border Agents Shot Tear Gas 
into Mexico. Was It Legal?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/ENF6-
HJ7R (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (noting that the presence of “women, children, 
and asylum seekers” in the area where tear gas was fired weighs strongly in 
favor of characterization as a disproportionate American response) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 130. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (“This case requires 
us to decide what constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that 
law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an 
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person. We hold that such 
claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
 131. See Dakwar, supra note 15 (describing domestic lawsuits filed by the 
ACLU challenging the use of tear gas). 
 132. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (disallowing 
a Bivens action to proceed where the victim, a Mexican national, had been 
fatally shot by American Border Patrol agents on Mexican soil); Rodriguez v. 
Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018) (allowing a Bivens action to proceed 
where the victim, a Mexican national, had been fatally shot by American 
Border Patrol agents on Mexican soil); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing 
these two cross-border shooting cases). 
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agents acting on United States soil, although the victims were 
in Mexico.133 
III. Determining the Constitution’s Extraterritorial Reach 
For over a century, the Supreme Court has considered 
whether various constitutional rights apply extraterritorially.134 
The Court has addressed these questions in a case-by-case 
manner, rejecting any strict rule based on territory.135 The two 
dominant approaches now used to determine the 
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution are the “substantial 
connections” approach articulated in Verdugo136 and the 
“functional” approach set forth in Boumediene.137 In addition, 
the Court historically used a “fundamental rights” approach in 
determining which constitutional rights apply to 
unincorporated United States territories, which continues to 
implicitly influence decisions today.138 These extraterritoriality 
approaches, none of which require physical presence in the 
United States to trigger constitutional protections, are 
discussed in Part III.A below.139 
At the same time, the Supreme Court has issued numerous 
precedents discussing the political branches’ plenary power over 
immigration that do rely on territoriality as a trigger for 
extending certain constitutional rights, such as due process, to 
 
 133. See infra Part IV.A. 
 134. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (considering 
whether residents of the Philippines were constitutionally entitled to jury 
trials). 
 135. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1990) 
(“And certainly, it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases to endorse the 
view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United States 
Government exercises its power.”). 
 136. See id. at 271 (“These cases, however, establish only that aliens 
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of 
the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.”). 
 137. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (stating “[t]he idea 
that extraterritoriality questions turn on objective factors and practical 
concerns, not formalism”). 
 138. See infra Part III.B. 
 139. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting 
that the “alien citizenship” of Afghani petitioners detained by the United 
States government in Afghanistan as enemy combatants did “not weigh 
against their claim to protection of the right of habeas corpus”). 
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noncitizens.140 Yet there are also plenary power cases that 
recognize exceptions to this territorial approach, including those 
pertaining to the “entry fiction” doctrine that treats certain 
noncitizens who are physically present in the United States as 
if they had not entered the country.141 These plenary power 
cases and the tensions they create with the Court’s 
extraterritoriality approaches are discussed in Part III.B below. 
A. Extraterritoriality Approaches 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions present two different, 
but overlapping approaches for analyzing the extraterritorial 
reach of constitutional rights in cases involving noncitizens: the 
“substantial connections” approach and a multi-factor, 
“functional” approach. Additionally, a much older body of case 
law applied a “fundamental rights” approach, which is also 
included here, because the nature of a right (i.e. whether it is 
“fundamental”) continues to influence decision making in this 
area.  
1. The “Substantial Connections” Approach 
The “substantial connections” approach reflects a theory 
that constitutional rights should be based on “membership,” 
being part of a social contract that triggers constitutional 
protections.142 “Membership” theory focuses on signs of 
belonging, which could be based on either status (e.g. 
citizenship, immigration status) or location (being inside a 
sovereign’s territory).143 While the “substantial connections” 
 
 140. See infra Part III.B. 
 141. See infra Part III.B. 
 142. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 917–18 (distinguishing the 
“membership” and “mutuality of obligation approaches”); see also Elizabeth A. 
Wilson, The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edits:” Sovereignty, 
“Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the 
Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165, 183 (2006) (“In the 
‘membership’ view, the reach of the Constitution is limited by the scope of the 
social contract: the act of social consensus that leads to the formation of the 
government, as represented by the written Constitution.”); Gerald L. Neuman, 
Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2004) (“The first 
kind of approach, a membership approach, treats certain individuals or locales 
as participating in a privileged relationship with the constitutional project, 
and therefore entitled to the benefit of constitutional provisions.”). 
 143. Wilson, supra note 142, at 184. 
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approach was most clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Verdugo,144 its roots are in a much earlier decision, 
Eisentrager,145 which involved the post-WWII occupation of 
Germany.146 
In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court considered whether 
German nationals convicted by a United States military 
commission of violating the laws of war and sent to the 
Landsberg Prison in Germany, where they were in the custody 
of the United States army, could invoke the writ of habeas 
corpus to challenge their detention.147 The Court held that they 
had no right to habeas corpus.148 Justice Jackson, writing for the 
majority, explained that a noncitizen is “accorded 
a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his 
identity with our society.”149 In describing different types of 
status along this spectrum, Justice Jackson distinguished 
non-resident “enemy aliens” and resident “enemy aliens,” noting 
that the latter had the “privilege of access to our courts” because 
“the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction gave the 
Judiciary power to act.”150 He then reasoned that non-resident 
“enemy aliens” must have fewer rights than resident “enemy 
aliens.”151 
 
 144. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 271 (“These cases, however, establish only that 
aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the 
territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with the 
country.”). 
 145. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950) (“The ultimate 
question in this case is one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States 
vis-a-vis military authorities in dealing with enemy aliens overseas.”). 
 146. See id. at 765–66 (“On May 8, 1945, the German High Command 
executed an act of unconditional surrender, expressly obligating all forces 
under German control at once to cease active hostilities.”). 
 147. See id. at 765 (“Twenty-one German nationals petitioned the District 
Court of the District of Columbia for writs of habeas corpus.”). 
 148. See id. at 768 (reasoning that the German nationals were not entitled 
to the writ, being that they were enemy aliens who had never stepped foot 
within the “territorial jurisdiction” of the United States). 
 149. Id. at 770. 
 150. Id. at 771. 
 151. See id. at 777–78 (“[T]he privilege of litigation has been extended to 
aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in 
the country implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these 
prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United 
States is sovereign . . . .”). 
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Although the petitioners in Eisentrager had not invoked the 
Fifth Amendment, the Court went on to address the 
extraterritorial application of the Due Process Clause because 
the lower court had addressed due process in reasoning that the 
“[r]ight to the writ . . . is a subsidiary procedural right that 
follows from possession of substantive constitutional rights.”152 
The Court rejected a reading of the Due Process Clause that 
interpreted the words “no person” to extend protections to “alien 
enemies anywhere in the world.”153 The Court feared a 
cascading effect, whereby extending the Fifth Amendment 
would require extending the “companion civil-rights 
Amendments” to enemy aliens during a military occupation.154 
Additionally, the Court concluded that it would be a “paradox” 
to extend due process rights to enemies when United States 
citizens soldiers were “stripped of their Fifth Amendment 
rights” upon being conscripted and subjected to military 
discipline.155 Justice Jackson concluded by declaring that no 
court or scholarly commentary supported extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution and that “the practice of every 
modern government is opposed to it.”156 While Eisentrager’s 
language suggests that strict territoriality is required for 
constitutional rights to apply to noncitizens, subsequent 
decisions clearly rejected that notion, drawing more on the 
concept of membership that Eisentrager described.157  
In Verdugo, decided forty years later, the Court drew on 
Eisentrager in articulating the “substantial connections” 
approach.158 Verdugo-Urquidez was a suspected Mexican cartel 
leader who was arrested in Mexico by Mexican authorities and 
 
 152. Id. at 781. 
 153. Id. at 781–82. 
 154. Id. at 782–84. 
 155. Id. at 783. 
 156. Id. at 784–85. 
 157. See id. at 770 (“The alien, to whom the United States has been 
traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of 
rights as he increases his identity with our society.”). 
 158. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) 
(“The Eisentrager opinion acknowledged that in some cases constitutional 
provisions extend beyond the citizenry; ‘the alien . . . has been accorded a 
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our 
society.’”). 
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brought to the United States for trial.159 United States and 
Mexican agents then searched his home in Mexico without a 
warrant and seized evidence that he was involved in smuggling 
drugs.160 Verdugo-Urquidez argued that the search and seizure 
of his home violated the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply.161  
The Court based its decision partly on the text of the Fourth 
Amendment, which uses the term “the people.”162 Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained that this “seems 
to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the 
Constitution,” including the Preamble, Article I, and the First, 
Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.”163 He 
contrasted the use of “the people” in these Amendments with 
the words “person” and “accused” used in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments respectively.164 He concluded that “the people” 
only “refers to a class of persons who are part of the national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”165  
 
 159. See id. at 262 (“In January 1986, Mexican police 
officers . . . apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and transported him to 
the United States Border Patrol station in Calexico, California. There, United 
States marshals arrested respondent and eventually moved him to a 
correctional center in San Diego, California, where he remains incarcerated 
pending trial.”). 
 160. See id. (“Following respondent’s arrest, Terry Bowen, a DEA agent 
assigned to the Calexico DEA office, decided to arrange for searches of 
Verdugo-Urquidez’s Mexican residences located in Mexicali and San Felipe.”). 
 161. See id. at 278 (“The conditions and considerations of this case would 
make adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
impracticable and anomalous.”). 
 162. See id. at 265 (“While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, 
it suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to 
a class of persons who are part of a national community . . . .”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 265–66 (inferring that the Framers intended “the people” 
in the Fourth Amendment to protect a narrower group than those protected 
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). 
 165. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Invoking Eisentrager’s notion of a scale of constitutional 
rights and drawing on the Insular Cases,166 which involved 
residents of United States territories, Justice Rehnquist 
reasoned that if not every constitutional provision applies to 
residents of United States territories, then noncitizens in other 
places have an “even weaker” claim to the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection.167 Justice Rehnquist also described Eisentrager as 
“reject[ing] the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth 
Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United 
States.”168 Although that part of Eisentrager was dicta, Justice 
Rehnquist reinforced it by stating, “our rejection of 
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was 
emphatic.”169 He reasoned that if this is true of the Fifth 
Amendment, “which speaks in the relatively universal term of 
‘person,’ it would seem even more true with respect to the 
Fourth Amendment, which applies only to the ‘people’”170 
While Verdugo cited numerous plenary power cases holding 
that noncitizens enjoy certain constitutional rights if they are 
physically present in the United States, Justice Rehnquist 
found that these cases “establish only that aliens receive 
constitutional protections when they have come within the 
territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections to this country.”171 The Court distinguished 
Lopez-Mendoza, in which it had assumed that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to undocumented noncitizens in 
 
 166. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 200 (1901) (holding that Puerto 
Rico was not a foreign country for purposes of tariff law after it was formally 
ceded by Spain to the United States); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 
221–22 (1901) (concluding that neither Puerto Rico nor Hawaii were foreign 
countries); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 235–36 (1901) (finding that 
the President lacked the authority to exact unlimited duties on Puerto Rico 
following Spain’s cession of Puerto Rico to the United States); Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that while Puerto Rico was a 
territory of the United States, it was not a part of the United States for the 
purposes of the “revenue clauses of the Constitution”); Armstrong v. United 
States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 (1901) (disallowing duties to be imposed on American 
goods entering Puerto Rico following the ratification of the Treaty of Paris); 
Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392, 397 (1901) (concluding that sea 
trade with Puerto Rico was domestic in nature, not international). 
 167. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1990). 
 168. Id. at 269. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 271 (emphasis added). 
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deportation proceedings, explaining that the noncitizens in that 
case “were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had 
accepted some societal obligations.”172  
Lastly, Justice Rehnquist found that, as in Eisentrager, 
extending the Fourth Amendment to Verdugo would have 
“significant and deleterious consequences for the United States 
in conducting activities beyond its borders.”173 He expressed 
concern that extending the Fourth Amendment to overseas 
search and seizure operations, including military operations, 
“could disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to 
foreign situations involving our national interest.”174 Global 
application of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Rehnquist 
reasoned, would “plunge [the Executive and Legislative 
Branches] into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be 
reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted 
abroad,” especially since a warrant would be “a dead letter 
outside the United States.”175 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence agreed that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply, but disagreed with the Court’s 
reasoning. In particular, he did not place “any weight on the 
reference to ‘the people’ in the Fourth Amendment as a source 
of restricting its protections.”176 Instead, Justice Kennedy found 
that applying the Fourth Amendment in this case “would make 
adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
impractical and anomalous.”177 This reasoning drew on Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Reid, a case holding that the United 
States citizen spouses of servicemen stationed abroad had a 
right to a jury trial on murder charges under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments and could not be tried by court martial.178 Justice 
 
 172. Id. at 273. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 273–74. 
 175. Id. at 274. 
 176. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 177. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1990) 
(emphasis added). 
 178. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) as “good authority for the 
proposition that there is no rigid rule that jury trial must always be provided 
in the trial of an American overseas, if the circumstances are such that trial 
by jury would be impractical and anomalous”). 
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Harlan had interpreted the Court’s precedents as rejecting any 
“rigid and abstract rule” and emphasized considering whether 
adherence to a constitutional guarantee would be “altogether 
impractical and anomalous.”179 He approached the 
constitutional question based on “the particular circumstances, 
the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which 
Congress had before it.”180  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence followed Justice Harlan’s 
approach and focused on the practical obstacles involved in 
extending the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements 
abroad.181 The practical concerns he identified included the 
“absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue 
warrants [in Mexico], the differing and perhaps unascertainable 
conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, 
and the need to cooperate with foreign officials.”182 Like Justice 
Harlan, he interpreted precedents, including the Insular Cases, 
as consistent with this “impracticable and anomalous” 
approach.183 Justice Kennedy subsequently developed this 
analysis into the “functional” approach in Boumediene, 
described below, where he wrote the majority decision.184  
2. The “Functional” Approach 
In 2008, the Court decided Boumediene, which represented 
a significant milestone in precedents analyzing the 
extraterritorial application of constitutional rights. Boumediene 
held that foreign nationals detained at Guantánamo Bay had a 
right to file habeas petitions under the Suspension Clause, 
invalidating Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act, which 
 
 179. Id. at 74. 
 180. Id. at 75. 
 181. See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[R]estrictions that the United States must observe with reference to aliens 
beyond its territory or jurisdiction depend . . . on general principles of 
interpretation, not on an inquiry as to who formed the Constitution or a 
construction that some rights are mentioned as being those of ‘the people.’”). 
 182. Id. at 278–79 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74). 
 183. See id. at 277–78 (concluding that there is no “rigid and abstract rule” 
that the Court must apply the Constitution “no matter what the conditions 
and considerations”). 
 184. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (“We hold that 
petitioners may invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas 
corpus.”). 
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stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over such petitions.185 In 
rejecting the government’s argument that the Suspension 
Clause did not protect foreign nationals detained outside of the 
United States, the Court stressed that its precedents, including 
Verdugo, had not followed a strict territorial approach.186 
Justice Kennedy, now writing for the majority, adopted a 
“functional” approach that draws on the “impracticable and 
anomalous” reasoning of his concurrence in Verdugo.187 He 
explained that “questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective 
factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”188 Once again, he 
interpreted precedents, including the Insular Cases, Reid, and 
Eisentrager, as consistent with this approach, highlighting ways 
that they all considered practical concerns.189  
In addition, Justice Kennedy stressed that the 
government’s proposed sovereignty-based test raised “troubling 
separation-of-powers concerns.”190 Because the political 
branches have “the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern 
territory,” allowing them to decide “when and where [the 
Constitution’s] terms apply” would give them the “power to 
switch the Constitution on or off at will,” thereby “permit[ting] 
a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government” and 
“leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not 
this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”191  
Noting that the writ of habeas corpus is itself an essential 
check on separation of powers, Justice Kennedy found it critical 
to ensure that “the test for determining the scope of this 
provision must not be subject to manipulation by those whose 
 
 185. See id. at 795–98 (stating that the “common thread” of the Insular 
Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid is the idea that questions of extraterritoriality 
turn on “objective factors and practical concerns”). 
 186. See id. at 755–65 (discussing the “practical considerations” weighed 
in the Court’s extraterritorial precedent). 
 187. See id. at 767 (considering “the practical obstacles” in applying the 
Constitution in this case). 
 188. Id. at 764. 
 189. See id. at 756–64 (analyzing the “common thread uniting” the Court’s 
extraterritorial precedent). 
 190. Id. at 764. 
 191. Id. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
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power it is designed to restrain.”192 The test that Justice 
Kennedy came up with and applied in Boumediene identified:  
at least three factors [as] relevant in determining the reach 
of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of 
the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which 
that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the 
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and 
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s 
entitlement to the writ.193  
While citizenship is part of the first factor, Boumediene 
makes it clear that citizenship is not determinative.194 
Regarding status, also part of the first factor, the Court noted 
that the petitioners denied that they were “enemy combatants,” 
and in any case were in a better situation than the petitioners 
in Eisentrager, who were convicted war criminals.195 The Court 
also examined the adequacy of the process through which the 
status determination was made and observed that, unlike in 
Eisentrager, “there ha[d] been no trial by military commission 
for violations of the laws of war.”196 The Eisentrager petitioners 
were “entitled to representation by counsel, allowed to introduce 
evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine 
the prosecution’s witnesses” in an adversarial proceeding, 
whereas the Boumediene petitioners had their status 
determined by Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which 
provided far fewer procedural protections.197 Among other 
things, they were not represented by an attorney.198 The 
 
 192. Id. at 765–66. 
 193. Id. at 766. 
 194. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(“[C]learly the alien citizenship of the petitioners in this case does not weigh 
against their claim to protection of the right of habeas corpus under the 
Suspension Clause. So far as citizenship is concerned, they differ in no 
material respect from the petitioners at Guantanamo who prevailed in 
Boumediene.”); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 729 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(explaining that “[n]either citizenship nor voluntary submission to American 
law is a prerequisite for constitutional rights” and that “citizenship is just one 
of several non-dispositive factors to consider”). 
 195. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766–67 (2008). 
 196. Id. at 767; see also Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96 (noting that the 
“Eisentrager petitioners were in a weaker position by having the status of war 
criminals . . . .”). 
 197. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767. 
 198. Id. 
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Boumediene Court concluded that these differences in 
procedural protections were “not trivial.”199 
Turning next to the nature of the site (Guantánamo Bay), 
the Court focused primarily on the level of United States 
control.200 Although the Court did not find that either de jure or 
de facto sovereignty was determinative, it placed great weight 
on the fact that the United States had total control over 
Guantánamo Bay and had maintained that control for over a 
century, despite a hostile government’s de jure sovereignty over 
the property.201 By contrast, in Eisentrager, the United States 
had only temporary control over the Landsberg prison in 
Germany.202  
The Court then examined the practical obstacles in 
recognizing a right to habeas corpus. One of the main 
considerations was national security.203 The Court observed 
that “if the detention facility were located in an active theater 
of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be ‘impractical or 
anomalous’ would have more weight.”204 The Court 
distinguished Eisentrager, which involved a post-war 
occupation where many wartime problems remained, noting 
 
 199. Id.; see also Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96 (observing that the “adequacy 
of process” factor cut in favor of petitioners, who were detainees at Bagram 
Airfield in Afghanistan, because their status had been determined by the 
“Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board,” which afforded even fewer 
procedural protections than the Combatant Status Review Tribunals in 
Boumediene). 
 200. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770–71 (distinguishing the amount of 
control the United States government had over the detainees in Guantánamo 
Bay from the amount of control the United States had over the detainees 
involved in Eisentrager). 
 201. Id.  
 202. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950) (discussing the 
United States’ control in post-war Germany); see also Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 
97 (analogizing the United States’ involvement with Bagram Airfield in 
Afghanistan to temporary control of the Landsberg prison in Eisentrager). The 
D.C. Circuit distinguished Boumediene by noting that “[i]n Bagram, while the 
United States has options as to duration of the lease agreement, there is no 
indication of any intent to occupy the base with permanence, nor is there 
hostility on the part of the ‘host’ country.” Id. 
 203. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769–70 (explaining that the threats 
present in Eisentrager were “not apparent” in Guantánamo Bay). 
 204. Id. at 770; cf. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97 (distinguishing Boumediene 
on the basis that Bagram Airfield, unlike Guantánamo Bay, was an active 
“theater of war”). 
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that “American forces stationed in Germany faced potential 
security threats from a defeated enemy.”205 Based on its analysis 
of these factors, the Court concluded that the petitioners were 
entitled to invoke the writ of habeas corpus.206 Additionally, the 
Court found that the Detainee Treatment Act’s (DTA) review 
process, which could take years, was an inadequate substitute 
for the writ.207 The Boumediene Court never reached the 
petitioners’ due process argument.208  
3. The “Fundamental Rights” Approach 
While the two approaches discussed above represent the 
dominant ways of analyzing constitutional extraterritoriality 
issues today, there is also an older, “fundamental rights” 
approach that continues to influence decisions implicitly. The 
“fundamental rights” approach emerged in the early 1900s in 
the Insular Cases, which involved unincorporated United States 
territories that were never intended to become part of the 
 
 205. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769; see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784 
(expressing concern about judicial interference with the military’s efforts to 
contain “enemy elements, guerilla fighters, and ‘werewolves’”). 
 206. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008). 
 207. See id. at 794–95 (“[T]he DTA review procedures are an inadequate 
substitute for habeas corpus.”). 
 208. See id. at 785 (making “no judgment whether the CSRTs, as currently 
constituted, satisfy due process standards”); see also Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 
990, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that Boumediene did not address whether the 
due process clause applied to the Guantánamo detainees). Some federal 
courts, however, have misconstrued Boumediene as rejecting the due process 
claims. See Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]t 
remains the law of this circuit that, after Boumediene, aliens detained at 
Guantanamo may not invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.”); Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he due process clause does not apply to aliens without property or 
presence in the sovereign territory of the United States.”), vacated and 
remanded, 559 U.S. 131 (2010), judgment reinstated and modified, 605 F.3d 
1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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United States.209 In Downes v. Bidwell,210 the first of the Insular 
Cases, the Court recognized that “unrestrained possession of 
power” could engulf the territories’ inhabitants, which included 
both citizens and noncitizens, in “centralized despotism.”211 The 
Court found that the Constitution guarded against such 
despotism by protecting certain “fundamental rights.”212 Thus, 
while the Court did not extend full constitutional protections to 
inhabitants of the territories, it recognized that some set of 
fundamental protections applied.213 
Cases from the early 1900s defined fundamental rights as 
those that are the “basis of all free government”214 or impose 
“limitations in favor of personal rights,”215 while more modern 
decisions defined them as being “fundamental in [the] 
international sense” of incorporating the “shared beliefs of 
 
 209. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 8, at 1642–43 (discussing lower court 
treatment of the applicability of the Due Process Clause outside of the United 
States); Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa and the 
Last U.S. Nationals, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 99 (2013) (examining the 
Insular Cases); Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the 
Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 325–27 (2011) 
[hereinafter Lobel, Fundamental Norms] (same); Christina Duffy Burnett, A 
Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 973, 982–84 (2009) (analyzing Boumediene’s effect on the Insular Cases); 
Robert Katz, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution to 
U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 782–83 (1992) (identifying the 
“fundamental rights” that the Insular Cases determined applied to the 
unincorporated territories). 
 210. 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
 211. See id. at 280 (holding that Puerto Rico became a territory of the 
United States but was not part of the United States under the Revenue Clause 
of the Constitution). 
 212. Id. at 291 (White, J., concurring). 
 213. See id. at 283 (“Even if regarded as aliens, they are entitled under the 
principles of the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and property.”); 
see also Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the 
United States and its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 
458–59 (1992) (describing Congress’s ability to determine which territories are 
incorporated and thus protected by constitutional rights). 
 214. Downes, 182 U.S. at 291 (White, J., concurring). 
 215. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904) (quoting Late Corp. 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 
1, 44 (1890)). 
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diverse cultures.”216 To determine if a right is fundamental, 
courts looked at the specific right in question, not the entire 
constitutional Amendment.217 Thus, the Fifth Amendment right 
to due process was deemed fundamental,218 while the Fifth 
Amendment right to a grand jury indictment was not.219 Once a 
right was determined to be fundamental, it was required 
regardless of any practical obstacles.220 Non-fundamental 
constitutional rights, on the other hand, would only be extended 
to the territories if it was not “impracticable and anomalous” to 
do so.221 
Although Verdugo and Boumediene did not explicitly 
discuss the relevance of whether a right is fundamental, 
commentators have recognized that this inquiry is implicit in 
those decisions.222 In fact, both decisions cite the Insular Cases. 
In Verdugo, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence points out that the 
warrant requirement is not universally accepted, noting that 
Mexico has “wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions,” 
which indicates that he did not view the right as fundamental 
 
 216. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying 
both a “fundamental rights” test and an “impractical and anomalous” test). 
 217. See Morrison, supra note 209, at 121 (explaining how rights within 
the Constitution are determined). 
 218. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922) (concluding that 
due process was a fundamental right that applied in the territory of Puerto 
Rico, but the jury trial provisions in Article III and the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments were not fundamental and therefore did not apply); Examining 
Bd. of Eng’rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976) (“It is clear now, 
however, that the protections accorded by either the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment or the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment apply to residents of Puerto Rico.”). 
 219. See Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (“That the 
requirement of an indictment by grand jury is not included within the 
guaranty of ‘due process of law’ is of course well settled.”). 
 220. See Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 327 (discussing 
the distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental rights). 
 221. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 
also Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 328 (“[T]he principle that 
emerges . . . [is] that reasonable, practical considerations could justify a 
determination that a particular right is inapplicable overseas, except where 
fundamental interests of the individual . . . were at stake.”). 
 222. See Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 329–30, 332–33 
(analyzing the decisions and finding them consistent with the “‘Insular Cases’ 
principle that fundamental rights follow the flag”). 
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in an “international sense.”223 In Boumediene, on the other 
hand, Justice Kennedy stressed the “fundamental” character of 
the writ of habeas corpus and its “vital” importance in protecting 
against prolonged and arbitrary detention.224 Consequently, 
Gerald Neuman has described the “normative valuation of the 
importance of the particular right under consideration” as a 
fourth factor inherent in Boumediene’s functional approach.225 
Jules Lobel has proposed using international law to identify 
fundamental rights applicable to the United States 
government’s extraterritorial actions.226 International law 
recognizes certain norms as non-derogable or jus cogens, 
meaning they are binding in all situations, including during a 
war or national emergency.227 These non-derogable norms 
include torture, genocide, slavery, extrajudicial execution, 
prolonged arbitrary detention without judicial review, and 
non-refoulement, the prohibition against returning someone to 
a country where they face a likelihood of persecution or 
torture.228 Lobel argues that such “heinous or odious acts are 
 
 223. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278–79 (1990) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 224. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739, 743, 798 (2008). 
 225. Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After 
Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 273, 287 (2009). 
 226. Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 334–43; see also Sarah 
H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 225, 225–26, 281–82 (2010) (arguing that Boumediene “opened 
a space for aligning U.S. domestic obligations more closely to contemporary 
international legal approaches” and proposing, inter alia, using fundamental 
rights as a limiting principle). 
 227. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (defining a jus cogens or “peremptory” norm 
as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character”). 
 228. See Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 310 (listing the 
certain basic norms of a “civilized society”); Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement 
and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures that Threaten Refugee 
Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22–28 (2008) (discussing non-refoulement 
as a jus cogens norm); William Thomas Worster, Contracting Out of 
Non-Refoulement Protections, 27 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 81 
(2017) (“Even a conservative interpretation of the principle must conclude 
that, at a minimum, when the person is at risk for persecution, torture, or 
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never justified by . . . practical considerations.”229 Incorporating 
an examination of international fundamental rights into 
Boumediene’s functional approach, Lobel contends, would 
reintegrate the rationale underlying the Insular Cases but 
provide a contemporary reference to international law.230  
B. The Plenary Power Doctrine and Constitutional Rights 
In a body of jurisprudence that developed in parallel to the 
extraterritoriality cases discussed above, the Court defined the 
plenary power over immigration and analyzed its impact on 
constitutional rights. To date, the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the interaction between these two bodies of 
jurisprudence, which the Third Circuit described as possibly 
“competing” constitutional fields.231 The plenary power doctrine 
provides that the political branches have the sovereign power to 
exclude noncitizens from the United States with very limited 
judicial review.232 Although the Court initially extended the 
plenary power to the expulsion or deportation of noncitizens 
already in the United States,233 it has since modified its position 
 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, non-refoulement is a jus cogens 
obligation.”). 
 229. Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 336. 
 230. Id. at 338. 
 231. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 434 (3d Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017). 
 232. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The 
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to 
the government of the United States . . . cannot be granted away or restrained 
on behalf of any one.”); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 
(1892) (discussing the sovereign’s right to admit noncitizens into the United 
States); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) 
(same). 
 233. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The 
right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners . . . is as absolute and unqualified 
as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”); Wong 
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236  – 38 (1896) (holding that the 
government could summarily expel aliens already residing within the United 
States, but that it could not subject such aliens to criminal punishment on 
account of their unlawful presence without due process); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 
U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (describing the power to “expel or exclude aliens” from 
the United States). 
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to require certain constitutional due process protections for 
noncitizens inside the country.234 
There are at least two key points of tension between the 
plenary power and extraterritoriality jurisprudence. First, 
while the extraterritoriality approaches described in Part III.A 
above reject territoriality as necessary to extend constitutional 
rights to noncitizens, the plenary power cases generally rely on 
physical presence in the United States as a trigger for 
constitutional rights such as due process.235 Second, as an 
exception to the general territoriality rule, the plenary power 
cases recognize an “entry fiction” doctrine that treats certain 
individuals physically present in the United States as if they 
were at the border and had not entered.236 However, the scope 
of the “entry fiction” doctrine regarding noncitizens in the 
interior of the United States remains unclear, creating 
uncertainty regarding its relevance to an extraterritoriality 
analysis.237  
1. Territoriality as a Trigger for Constitutional Rights 
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the political 
branches’ plenary power as extending not only to decisions 
about who to admit and exclude from the United States, but also 
to decisions about removing noncitizens already here.238 Over 
 
 234. See Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (concluding 
that an alien alleged to be in the United States illegally cannot be deported 
“arbitrarily” and must be given an “opportunity to be heard”); Kwong Hai 
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–98 (1953) (describing the protections 
necessary before deporting a noncitizen); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 
32–33 (1982) (same); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
212 (1953) (same); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (same); Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (same). 
 235. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 236. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 237. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 434 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
Suspension Clause and plenary power precedent); see also HILLEL R. SMITH, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 6 
(2019), https://perma.cc/TQ2P-593N (PDF) (explaining the expedited removal 
process). 
 238. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707 (“The right of a nation to expel or 
deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards 
becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as 
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time, however, the Supreme Court modified its position and 
began extending constitutional protections to noncitizens who 
had already entered the United States. 
In Yamataya v. Fisher,239 the Court found that a citizen of 
Japan who, according to immigration officers, had been 
wrongfully admitted into the United States as someone likely to 
become a public charge, was entitled to Fifth Amendment due 
process protections, even though she had only been present in 
the country for a few days before the authorities sought to 
deport her.240 The Court explained that the Executive could not  
arbitrarily . . . cause an alien who has entered the country, 
and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and 
a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here, 
to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all 
opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his 
right to be and remain in the United States.241  
Similarly, in Wong Wing,242 the Court found that “all persons 
within the territory of the United States are entitled to the 
protection” of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.243 
During the Cold War Era, the Court issued additional 
significant precedents addressing the plenary power doctrine 
that linked constitutional rights to physical presence. In Kwong 
Hai Chew,244 the Court explained that “once an alien lawfully 
enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our 
borders.”245 There, the Court held that a permanent resident 
returning from a five-month voyage as a crewman on a United 
States merchant ship had a right to procedural due process.246 
 
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance 
into the country.”). 
 239. Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 240. Id. at 101–02.  
 241. Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
 242. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (concluding that 
a statute that imposed a year of hard labor on Chinese noncitizens found to be 
illegally present in the United States and ordered deported was 
unconstitutional) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). 
 243. Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
 244. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). 
 245. Id. at 596 n.5 (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) 
(Murphy, J., concurring)). 
 246. Id. at 602–03. 
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Although Chew was temporarily excluded and “not permitted to 
land,”247 the Court decided to “assimilate” his status “to that of 
an alien continuously residing and physically present in the 
United States”248 and therefore concluded that he had a right to 
due process.249 
In subsequent decades, the Court confirmed the importance 
of territorial presence as a trigger for constitutional rights in a 
number of precedents that recognized the plenary power but did 
not involve challenges to immigration decisions. For example, in 
Mathews,250 which involved access to federal Medicaid benefits, 
the Court found that the Due Process Clause applies to everyone 
“within the jurisdiction of the United States,” including those 
“whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or 
transitory.”251 In Zadvydas,252 the Court held that noncitizens 
with final deportation orders had a liberty interest under the 
Fifth Amendment that protected against unreasonably 
prolonged detention.253 There, the Court acknowledged that 
“certain constitutional protections available to persons inside 
the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our 
geographic borders,” but explained that “once an alien enters 
the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process 
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, 
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”254 However, the Court has 
also recognized certain exceptions to territoriality, as explained 
below. 
2. Exceptions to Territoriality: The “Entry Fiction” Doctrine 
Other cases confirm the distinction between those who have 
entered, even unlawfully, and those seeking entry, but also 
 
 247. Id. at 595. 
 248. Id. at 596. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 251. Id. at 77. 
 252. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 253. See id. at 693 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
259, 269 (1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)) (discussing 
the rights of resident alien enemies). 
 254. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added). 
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recognize an exception called the “entry fiction” doctrine. In 
Mezei,255 the Court considered the case of a permanent resident 
who had lived in the United States for many years before 
traveling abroad to visit his dying mother. Upon his return 
twenty months later, he was detained at Ellis Island and denied 
admission to the United States.256 There, the Court explained, 
“aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, 
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional 
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law,”257 
confirming territorial presence as a trigger for due process 
protection.  
However, due to the “entry fiction” doctrine, Mezei was not 
treated as someone who was physically present in the United 
States, despite being on Ellis Island.258 Instead, he was “treated 
as if stopped at the border.”259 Consequently, the Court found 
that he had no due process rights.260 Similarly, in Knauff,261 the 
Court treated the German wife of a United States citizen 
detained on Ellis Island as someone who had not yet entered the 
United States.262 Accordingly, the Court rejected her attempt to 
challenge her exclusion without a hearing, concluding that 
“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due 
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”263  
In deciding whether to apply the entry fiction doctrine, the 
Court has, at times, considered ties to the United States. For 
example, in Landon v. Plasencia,264 the majority embraced 
community ties as a rationale for extending due process rights 
 
  255. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 256. See id. at 208 (explaining that Mezei was sent to Ellis Island after the 
immigration inspector excluded him from the United States pursuant to the 
Passport Act). 
 257. Id. at 212 (emphasis added). 
 258. See id. at 215 (describing Mezei’s “temporary harborage” at Ellis 
Island as “an act of legislative grace,” which provided no additional 
Constitutional protections and did not change his alien status). 
 259. Id. (emphasis added). 
 260. See id. at 214 (concluding that “the Attorney General may lawfully 
exclude respondent without a hearing”). 
 261. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 262. Id. at 539–40 (noting that petitioner, though married to an Army 
veteran of World War II, was detained at Ellis Island on the same day she 
sought to enter the United States to be naturalized). 
 263. Id. at 544. 
 264. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
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to a permanent resident returning to the United States after 
spending only a few days in Mexico.265 The Court recognized 
that it had “long held that an alien seeking initial admission to 
the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional 
rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or 
exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”266 But “once an alien 
gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that 
go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes 
accordingly.”267 The Court decided not to treat Plasencia as 
someone seeking admission in light of her strong ties to the 
United States.268 It distinguished Mezei on the basis that he had 
been abroad for a much longer period of time, explaining that 
“[i]f the permanent resident alien’s absence abroad is extended, 
of course, he may lose his entitlement to ‘assimilat[ion of his] 
status’ . . . to that of an alien continuously residing and 
physically present in the United States.”269 
The entry fiction doctrine has traditionally been applied to 
individuals like Mezei and Knauff, who were stopped “on the 
threshold of initial entry”270 and detained pending a 
determination of their admissibility.271 The Supreme Court has 
 
 265. See id. at 32 (reasoning that respondent was entitled to a deportation 
hearing because of her constitutional status as a “continuously present 
permanent resident alien”). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
 268. See id. at 23 (explaining that respondent had resided in Los Angeles 
for five years as a permanent resident alien with her husband, a United States 
citizen, and their minor children). 
 269. Id. at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 
590, 596 (1953)). 
 270. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) 
(emphasis added). 
 271. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539 (noting petitioner was “detained” prior to 
the Assistant Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization’s 
determination); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 175 
(1993) (“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those 
aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission, such as petitioner, and 
those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its 
legality.” (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212)); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 
230 – 31 (1925) (determining that an alien denied entry and initially held at 
Ellis Island was, notwithstanding her subsequent transfer to the custody of 
another entity while awaiting removal, “still in theory of law at the boundary 
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never addressed whether the entry fiction doctrine may also be 
applied to noncitizens who are already in the interior of the 
country.272 Some lower courts, however, have applied the entry 
fiction doctrine to noncitizens apprehended after illegally 
entering the United States.273  
This decision can have momentous consequences in terms 
of analyzing the reach of constitutional rights. If individuals 
apprehended in the interior may be treated as if they are 
seeking entry, then under the plenary power cases, courts may 
not be able to review decisions to remove them.274 On the other 
hand, under the extraterritoriality approaches described in Part 
III.A above, constitutional rights may still apply based on 
application of the “substantial connections” and/or “functional” 
tests. This raises questions about how the doctrines interact, 
which are explored in Part IV.  
IV. Analyzing Extraterritoriality in Border Enforcement 
In recent years, courts have grappled with how to apply the 
Court’s constitutional extraterritoriality tests and the plenary 
power doctrine in the context of border enforcement. This 
section examines recent federal court decisions in three types of 
cases involving these issues: (1) Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
challenges to cross-border shootings, which have resulted in a 
circuit split; (2) Suspension Clause habeas challenges to 
 
line and had gained no foothold in the United States” (citing Nishimura Ekiu 
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 661 (1892))). 
 272. See Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (denying 
certiorari of Third Circuit’s decision to apply the entry fiction doctrine to 
noncitizens). 
 273. See infra Part IV; Castro, 835 F.3d at 445–50 (applying the entry 
fiction doctrine to noncitizens apprehended after entering the United States 
and subjected to expedited removal orders); see also M.S.P.C. v. U.S. Customs 
& Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1175 (D.N.M. 2014) 
Petitioner, who undisputedly crossed approximately nine miles 
over the border and was apprehended within 30 minutes of 
crossing, does not have any substantial ties to this country to place 
the nature of her rights near those of a permanent resident. Thus, 
for purposes of the constitutional right to due process, Petitioner’s 
status is assimilated to that of an arriving alien. 
 274. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 
(1950) (“[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized 
by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government 
to exclude a given alien.”). 
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expedited removal orders, which have also resulted in a circuit 
split; and (3) a procedural due process challenge to the DHS’s 
practice of “metering” asylum seekers, which, at the time of this 
writing, is still being litigated in district court.  
A. Circuit Split on Cross-Border Shootings 
Two cases arising in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits involved 
cross-border shootings of Mexican teenagers by United States 
Border Patrol officers standing in the United States.275 In both 
cases, the families of the deceased teenagers brought Bivens 
claims for damages based on violations of the boys’ Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights.276 The Fifth Circuit issued two en banc 
decisions, first holding that the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on 
the Fifth Amendment claim (Hernández I),277 and subsequently, 
after a Supreme Court remand in 2017, holding that no Bivens 
remedy existed (Hernández II) and avoiding the Fourth 
Amendment issue.278 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, held 
in Rodriguez v. Swartz279 that the Fourth Amendment did 
 
 275. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 825 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Prado, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]his case involves one federal officer ‘engaged in his law 
enforcement duties’ in the United States who shot and killed an unarmed, 
fifteen-year-old Mexican boy standing a few feet away.”); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 
899 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that the officer struck the 
sixteen-year-old boy in the back). 
 276. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d at 815 (“The plaintiffs assert that Agent 
Mesa used deadly force without justification against Sergio Hernández, 
violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . .”); Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 
727–28 (explaining that the district court treated the shooting as a “seizure” 
under the Fourth Amendment but dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim). 
 277. See Hernández v. United States (Hernández I), 785 F.3d 117, 119–20 
(5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (rejecting Fourth Amendment claim because 
Hernández had no “significant voluntary connection” to the United States and 
denying the officer’s qualified immunity because the asserted right was not 
“clearly established”), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hernández v. Mesa, 
137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 278. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d at 823 (declining to rule on the 
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment and stating that 
“extending Bivens would interfere with the political branches’ oversight of 
national security and foreign affairs”). 
 279. 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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apply,280 that the agent was not entitled to qualified 
immunity,281 and that a Bivens remedy existed.282 The Ninth 
Circuit did not reach the Fifth Amendment issue.283 Because the 
Supreme Court ultimately held that there was no Bivens 
remedy in a cross-border shooting, it never resolved the 
underlying constitutional questions, although it did provide 
some insight, at least in dicta, on the relevant extraterritoriality 
tests.284 These decisions are discussed below. 
1. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Hernández 
Hernández v. United States285 involved a Border Patrol 
agent named Jesus Mesa Jr. who shot and killed a 
fifteen-year-old Mexican teenager named Sergio Adrián 
Hernández Güereca (Hernández).286 At the time of the shooting, 
Mesa was standing on United States soil, and Hernández was 
with a group of friends in a cement culvert that separates El 
Paso, Texas, from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.287 The international 
boundary runs down the middle of the culvert.288 The children 
were playing a game that involved running up the embankment 
 
 280. See id. at 731 (“J.A. had a Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
the objectively unreasonable use of deadly force by an American agent acting 
on American soil, even though Swartz’s bullets hit him in Mexico.”). 
 281. See id. at 734 (denying agent’s qualified immunity because the 
complaint made “a persuasive case for murder charges”). 
 282. See id. at 748 (“[D]espite our reluctance to extend Bivens, we do so 
here: no other adequate remedy is available, there is no reason to infer that 
Congress deliberately chose to withhold a remedy, and the asserted special 
factors either do not apply or counsel in favor of extending Bivens.”) 
 283. See id. at 734 (noting that if the Fifth Amendment did apply, the 
agent’s conduct would fail the “shocks the conscience” test). 
 284. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 754 n.1 (2020); see also Swartz v. 
Rodriguez, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2020 WL 981778 (Mar. 2, 2020) (mem.) (remanding 
in light of the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Hernández v. Mesa). 
 285. 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th 
Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 
2003 (2017), reheard en banc, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 
735 (2020).  
 286. See id. at 255 (explaining the circumstances in which Hernández was 
shot and killed). 
 287. Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017). 
 288. Id. 
EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS 801 
 
on the United States side, touching the fence at the top of the 
embankment, and then running back down.289 
Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at 
Hernández, one of which struck him in the face and killed 
him.290 After investigating the incident, the Department of 
Justice found that the shooting had occurred while smugglers 
attempting an illegal border crossing were throwing rocks, and 
it declined to bring charges against Mesa.291 Hernández’s 
parents then filed a lawsuit that included a Bivens claim for 
damages based on violations of Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights.292 
In 2014, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit held that 
Hernández lacked any Fourth Amendment rights, but that the 
shooting violated his Fifth Amendment substantive due process 
rights under the “shocks the conscience” test.293 When the Fifth 
Circuit reheard the case en banc in Hernández I, it affirmed the 
dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against Mesa, relying 
solely on Verdugo and reasoning that Hernández was “a 
Mexican citizen who had no ‘significant voluntary connection’ to 
the United States” and who “was on Mexican soil at the time he 
was shot.”294 However, the court was divided on whether the 
Fifth Amendment applied.295 The court ultimately disposed of 
the Fifth Amendment claim by concluding that even if a due 
 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See id. (“In the Department’s view, there was insufficient evidence 
that Mesa ’acted willfully and with the deliberate and specific intent to do 
something the law forbids . . . .’”). 
 292. Id. 
 293. See Hernández v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 278–79 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(concluding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Agent Mesa acted 
out of conscious-shocking malice or wantonness); id. at 281 (Dennis, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“I agree with the opinion of 
the court in declining to apply the Fourth Amendment in adjudicating the 
Appellants’ claims but I do so out of concern for pragmatic and political 
questions rather than on a formal classification of the litigants involved.”); id. 
at 281–82 (DeMoss, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that 
Hernández lacked any Fifth Amendment rights). 
 294. Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)). 
 295. See id. at 120 (describing the court as “somewhat divided” on the Fifth 
Amendment question). 
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process right existed, the agent was entitled to qualified 
immunity.296 The court reasoned that no case law at the time of 
the incident reasonably warned Agent Mesa that “the general 
prohibition of excessive force applies where the person injured 
by a U.S. official standing on U.S. soil is an alien who had no 
significant voluntary connection to, and was not in, the United 
States when the incident occurred.”297 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the 
Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in 2017.298 Describing the Fourth 
Amendment issue as “sensitive” and noting that it “may have 
consequences that are far reaching,”299 the Court found it 
imprudent to reach that issue when its intervening decision in 
Ziglar v. Abbasi300 on Bivens claims might make it 
unnecessary.301 In Abbasi, which involved the detention of 
terrorism suspects after the 9/11 attacks, the Court set forth a 
two-part Bivens analysis that requires courts to determine if the 
case presents a “new context” and if there are “special factors” 
that preclude extending Bivens.302  
As to the dismissal of Hernández’s Fifth Amendment claim 
on qualified immunity grounds, the Supreme Court found that 
the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was erroneous because it was 
undisputed “that Hernández’s nationality and the extent of his 
ties to the United States were unknown to Mesa at the time of 
the shooting.”303 The Court explained that “[t]he qualified 
immunity analysis thus is limited to ‘the facts that were 
 
 296. See id. (applying qualified immunity because the right at issue was 
not “clearly established”). 
 297. Id. 
 298. See Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017) (“The Court now 
vacates the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remands for further 
proceedings.”). 
 299. Id. at 2007. 
 300. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 301. See Hernández, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 (declining to resolve the Fourth 
Amendment issue). 
 302. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–61 (pointing to the constitutional right 
at issue, the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond, 
and the risk of the judiciary’s disruptive intrusion into the functioning of the 
federal government’s co-equal branches as non-exclusive examples of such 
“meaningful” differences). 
 303. Hernández, 137 S. Ct. at 2007. 
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knowable to the defendant officers’ at the time they engaged in 
the conduct in question.”304 
The dissent by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
would have reversed the Fifth Circuit’s Fourth Amendment 
holding and remanded for consideration of the Bivens and 
qualified immunity questions.305 The dissent applied 
Boumediene, emphasizing its focus on objective factors and 
practical concerns.306 The objective factors that the dissent 
highlighted were the unique features of the border area where 
Hernández was shot.307  
On remand, the Fifth Circuit held in Hernández II that no 
Bivens remedy was available and therefore did not reach the 
Fourth Amendment issue.308 It applied Abbasi and found that 
the cross-border shooting presented a “new context” for a Bivens 
claim and that “special factors” existed that weighed against 
extending Bivens.309 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Rodriguez 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez involved similar 
facts but reached the opposite conclusion.310 There, a Border 
Patrol agent named Swartz was standing on United States soil 
when he shot and killed a sixteen-year-old Mexican teenager 
named J.A., who was walking down the Calle Internacional, a 
 
 304. Id. (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per curiam)). 
 305. See id. at 2008 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that a reversal 
would entail a right to bring an action for damages under Bivens). 
 306. See id. at 2008–09 (“[O]ur precedents make clear that ‘questions of 
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not 
formalism.’” (quoting Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008))). 
 307. See id. at 2009 (noting that “the culvert itself has special 
border-related physical features”). 
 308. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(explaining that an extension of Bivens would interfere with oversight of 
national security and foreign affairs and declining to decide the Fourth 
Amendment question). 
 309. See id. at 816–17 (describing the “proper inquiry” under Abbasi as 
“whether ‘the case is different in any meaningful way’ from prior Bivens cases” 
(quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859 (2017))).  
 310. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding 
that the agent violated a “clearly established constitutional right” and that 
J.A.’s mother had a cause for money damages). 
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street in Nogales, Mexico, that runs parallel to the border.311 
Without warning or provocation, Swartz fired between fourteen 
and thirty bullets across the border, through the border fence, 
hitting J.A. approximately ten times.312 J.A.’s mother, Araceli 
Rodriguez, sued Swartz for money damages, alleging violations 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.313 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was 
violated and therefore did not reach the Fifth Amendment 
claim.314 The court applied Boumediene’s functional approach, 
examining “[J.A.’s] citizenship and status, the location where 
the shooting occurred, and any practical concerns that arise.”315 
The court explained that “[n]either citizenship nor voluntary 
submission to American law is a prerequisite for constitutional 
rights.”316 Rather, “citizenship is just one of several 
non-dispositive factors to consider.”317 Likewise, the court did 
not find geographic control to be dispositive, noting that Mexico 
had “both sovereignty and actual control over the street where 
J.A. was hit.”318 Nevertheless, the court concluded that “J.A. had 
a Fourth Amendment right to be free from the unreasonable use 
of such deadly force.”319 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
appeared to rely on practicalities, stressing that applying the 
Fourth Amendment to this case “would simply say that 
American officers must not shoot innocent, non-threatening 
people for no reason.”320  
The Ninth Circuit gave little weight to Verdugo’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s text, reasoning that 
Justice Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote in that 
 
 311. See id. at 727 (noting that J.A. was walking “peacefully” down the 
street). 
 312. See id. (describing Calle Internacional as a “main thoroughfare lined 
with commercial and residential buildings”). 
 313. See id. (noting J.A.’s mother was acting “both individually and as a 
personal representative of J.A.’s estate”). 
 314. See id. at 728 (affirming the district court’s decision “to let 
Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment claim proceed”). 
 315. Id. at 729 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008)). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 730. 
 319. Id.  
 320. Id. at 731. 
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case, had disagreed with the textual analysis.321 The court went 
on to distinguish Verdugo in several ways.322 First, it stressed 
that the agents in Verdugo conducted the search and seizure of 
property in Mexico, whereas Swartz acted on United States 
soil.323 Second, the court pointed out that the agents in Verdugo 
knew they were searching a Mexican citizen’s property, whereas 
Swartz could not have known J.A.’s citizenship at the time of 
the shooting.324 Third, the court noted that Verdugo took into 
consideration practical concerns involving warrants and 
searches that did not apply in the context of a cross-border 
shooting.325  
Rodriguez went on to find that the use of deadly force was 
unreasonable, since the government had no interest whatsoever 
in shooting J.A, and that Swartz was not entitled to qualified 
immunity for the Fourth Amendment violation.326 In finding 
that Swartz had violated a “clearly established” constitutional 
right, the key question in the qualified immunity analysis, the 
court explained that Swartz did not know J.A.’s citizenship at 
the time of the shooting.327 The court also extended a Bivens 
remedy for damages, finding no other adequate remedy 
available, no reason to infer that Congress chose to deliberately 
 
 321. See id. at 730 (noting that while the majority opinion relied on an 
interpretation of “the people,” Justice Kennedy did not). 
 322. See id. (“[T]his case is not like Verdugo-Urquidez for several 
reasons.”). 
 323. See id. at 731 (explaining that American law governed because 
Swartz acted inside the United States). 
 324. See id. at 731 n.34 (comparing Boumediene, which used a detainee’s 
alleged innocence as a reason to apply constitutional protections). 
 325. See id. at 731 (emphasizing that this incident, by contrast, occurred 
on American soil). 
 326. See id. at 732 (noting that J.A. “was not suspected of any 
crime[,] . . . was not fleeing or resisting arrest . . . [and] did not pose a threat 
of harm to anyone at all”). 
 327. See id. at 732–33 (explaining the analysis “is limited to the facts that 
were knowable to the defendant officers at the time they engaged in the 
conduct in question” (quoting Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2003 (2017) 
(per curiam))). 
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withhold a remedy, and no special factors that weighed against 
extending the Bivens remedy.328 
3. The Supreme Court’s Decisions in Hernández and Rodriguez 
In February 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Hernández II, holding that there 
was no Bivens remedy.329 Although the Court’s opinion did not 
discuss the underlying constitutional issues, it addressed the 
relevant extraterritoriality test in a footnote, stating that 
Verdugo “is not dispositive of the Fourth Amendment claim in 
this case” because its practical concerns about a warrant being 
a dead letter outside the United States did not apply.330 The 
Court further stated that “it would not be ‘impractical’ or 
‘anomalous’ to subject Mesa’s United States based conduct to 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny,” citing Boumediene.331 Since these 
issues were not directly before the Court, this footnote 
constitutes dicta, but it nevertheless provides valuable insight 
into the Court’s views. Shortly thereafter, the Court granted 
certiorari in Rodriguez, remanding the case in light of its 
decision in Hernández.332 
B. The Circuit Split on Habeas Challenges to Expedited 
Removal Orders 
A circuit split has also emerged on the question of whether 
noncitizens have a habeas right under the Suspension Clause to 
challenge an expedited removal order. In Castro,333 the Third 
Circuit held that a group of Honduran and Salvadoran mothers 
and children who were subject to expedited removal orders could 
not invoke the Suspension Clause to challenge their removal 
 
 328. See id. at 739–48 (finding that J.A.’s alternatives were inadequate, 
that the case did not implicate policy, that the case did not concern national 
security, and that extending Bivens would not cause problems in foreign 
policy). 
 329. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020). 
 330. Id. at 754 n.1. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Swartz v. Rodriguez, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2020 WL 981778 (Mar. 2, 2020) 
(mem.). 
 333. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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orders.334 The Ninth Circuit, however, reached the opposite 
conclusion in Thuraissigiam,335 finding that a Sri Lankan 
national could invoke the Suspension Clause and obtain judicial 
review of his expedited removal order through habeas corpus 
proceedings.336 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Thuraissigiam’s case on October 18, 2019.337 These conflicting 
decisions are discussed below. 
1. The Third Circuit’s Decision in Castro 
In Castro, the Third Circuit considered a case involving 
twenty-eight asylum-seeking families who had received 
negative credible fear determinations, followed by expedited 
removal orders.338 The families argued that the statutory 
constraints on judicial review of their expedited removal orders 
violated the Suspension Clause.339 In addressing this question, 
the Third Circuit began by expressing consternation over the 
interaction between plenary power cases and extraterritoriality 
cases on the reach of habeas under the Suspension Clause, 
finding that these constitutional fields are “perhaps even 
competing” with each other.340 The court ultimately expressed 
“commitment to the full breadth” of the plenary power doctrine, 
“at least as to aliens at the border seeking initial admission to 
the country.”341 
 
 334. See id. at 445 (reasoning that petitioners failed to satisfy 
“Boumediene’s first hurdle” because they did not prove “entitlement vel non to 
the protections of the Suspension Clause”). 
 335. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097 (9th 
Cir. 2019) 
 336. See id. at 1111 (disagreeing with Castro’s approach to the Suspension 
Clause). 
 337. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 427 (2019). 
 338. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 425 (“[F]ollowing interviews with an asylum 
officer and subsequent de novo review by an immigration judge (IJ), 
Petitioners’ fear of persecution was found to be not credible, such that their 
expedited removal orders became administratively final.”). 
 339. See id. (explaining that each family filed a habeas petition 
challenging their removals as violations of the Suspension Clause). 
 340. See id. at 434 (noting that while petitioners relied on Suspension 
Clause jurisprudence, the government urged the court to apply the plenary 
power doctrine). 
 341. Id. at 443. 
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Characterizing the families in the case as “recent 
surreptitious entrants,” the court decided to apply the entry 
fiction doctrine and treat them as noncitizens “seeking initial 
admission to the United States.”342 This was a significant leap, 
given that the petitioners were arrested after entering the 
country.343 Having classified them as noncitizens seeking initial 
admission, the Third Circuit then applied the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Plasencia, which stated that a noncitizen seeking 
initial admission to the United States “has no constitutional 
rights regarding his application [for entry into the country].”344 
The court therefore concluded that the petitioners’ challenge 
failed under the first step of Boumediene’s analysis, which 
requires determining whether the Suspension Clause applies.345 
Consequently, the court did not reach the second step of the 
analysis, which would require determining if the statute 
provided an adequate substitute for habeas.346 
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that this 
reasoning “appear[ed] to ignore” Supreme Court precedents 
relating to the due process rights of noncitizens physically 
present in the country, it concluded that no case had clearly held 
that “arriving aliens” were entitled to due process protections.347 
The court further reasoned that the petitioners’ ties to the 
United States were insufficient to invoke the Suspension Clause 
because they had been present in the country for only a few 
hours before being apprehended by immigration officers.348  
The Third Circuit revisited the issue in a subsequent case, 
Osorio-Martinez,349 brought by four of the same juvenile 
 
 342. Id. at 448. 
 343. See id. at 427 (“[T]he vast majority [of the petitioners] were 
apprehended within an hour or less of entering the country, and at distances 
of less than one mile from the border . . . .”). 
 344. Id.; see also Landon v. Pascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (noting that 
the admission or exclusion of aliens at the border is a sovereign right). 
 345. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 446 (noting that a challenge to the Executive’s 
decision to remove petitioners cannot rely on the Suspension Clause). 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at 447–48. 
 348. See id. at 445 (characterizing petitioners’ status as seeking initial 
entry into the United States based on the amount of time they had been across 
the border). 
 349. 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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petitioners from Castro two years after their initial detention.350 
By that point, the children had obtained Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status, a type of legal status based on abuse, neglect, 
or abandonment by at least one parent that puts children on a 
path to permanent residency.351 The court found that their new 
status reflected “significant ties” to the country and required 
heightened protections under the statute.352 Based on these 
changes, the court held that the children had a right to habeas 
corpus.353 Furthermore, because the statutory restrictions on 
judicial review of expedited removal orders prevented a court 
from considering whether there was an “erroneous application 
or interpretation of relevant law,” the court concluded that it 
failed to provide “even [that] ‘uncontroversial’ baseline of 
review” required by Boumediene.354 
Curiously, even in this situation when the children had 
obtained legal status, indicating a legal admission to the 
country, the court still considered whether they should be 
treated the same as someone outside the United States and held 
that they had habeas rights only after applying Supreme Court 
precedents addressing the extraterritorial application of 
constitutional rights, including Boumediene, Verdugo, and 
Eisentrager.355 Thus, even physical presence after being granted 
legal status did not automatically trigger a constitutional right 
to habeas corpus in the Third Circuit’s view.356 Instead, the 
court went through a detailed extraterritoriality analysis.357 
 
 350. See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 893 F.3d 153 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (holding that section 1252 of the INA violates the Suspension 
Clause when applied to Special Immigration Juvenile (SIJ) designees). 
 351. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a), (h)(1) (2018) (detailing requirements to 
adjust immigration status of a nonimmigrant and additional requirements 
when applied to special immigrants). 
 352. See Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 167 (noting that Congress 
determined additional protections should be afforded to such designated 
special immigrants). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 177 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)). 
 355. See id. at 168 (determining that physical presence alone is 
insufficient to grant constitutional protections). 
 356. Id. 
 357. See id. (relying on Castro to distinguish petitioners’ position from that 
of an alien seeking entry). 
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2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Thuraissigiam 
In Thuraissigiam, the Ninth Circuit was confronted by the 
same issue that the Third Circuit had addressed in Castro, but 
applied different reasoning and reached the opposite 
conclusion.358 The court found that a Sri Lankan asylum seeker 
who had failed a credible fear interview and received an 
expedited removal order could challenge that order through a 
habeas petition.359 There, the court rejected the government’s 
argument that the petitioner lacked all habeas and procedural 
due process rights.360 
While the Third Circuit chose the plenary power doctrine as 
its starting point, the Ninth Circuit began with Boumediene’s 
“analytical blueprint.”361 Since Boumediene answered the initial 
question of whether the Suspension Clause applies by reference 
to the common law history of the writ and its precedents, the 
court followed the same approach, looking at “1789-era practice, 
the finality era cases, and other relevant cases.”362 The court 
found that cases from the finality era, the period between 1891 
and 1952 when the immigration statute provided no judicial 
review of deportation orders, established that the Supreme 
Court still allowed arriving noncitizens to invoke habeas 
review.363 Accordingly, the court held that Thuraissigiam could 
also invoke the Suspension Clause.364 While the court 
acknowledged Boumediene’s three-factor test, it found the test 
to be of limited relevance and therefore applied it only in a 
 
 358. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (holding that section 1252 violates the Suspension Clause when the 
section did not provide a meaningful opportunity for petitioner to demonstrate 
that he was detained under improper application of law). 
 359. See id. at 1118 (finding that “meager procedural protections” provided 
by the administrative process controlling fear determinations failed to meet 
minimal constitutional standards). 
 360. See id. at 1112 (noting that “[t]he Court in Boumediene . . . explicitly 
declined to link due process rights and Suspension clause rights”). 
 361. See id. at 1106 (“Boumediene is our starting point, even if it does not 
provide a direct answer to Thuraissigiam’s challenge.”). 
 362. Id. at 1112. 
 363. See id. at 1115 (analyzing the development of habeas corpus 
precedent). 
 364. See id. (determining that the government failed to provide 
precedential support that Thuraissigiam should not be afforded rights under 
the Suspension Clause). 
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footnote, concluding that it supported the court’s conclusion that 
habeas applied.365  
The court then analyzed whether habeas review was so 
limited by the INA as to effectively suspend the writ as applied 
to the petitioner.366 Based on finality era precedents, the court 
found that habeas review included not only legal questions, but 
also mixed questions of law and fact related to removal orders.367 
The court also stressed that the “meager procedural protections” 
available in credible fear determinations are compounded by the 
fact that the statute “prevents any judicial review of whether 
DHS complied with the procedural requirements in an 
individual case, or applied the correct legal standards.”368 The 
court therefore concluded that this scheme did not satisfy the 
“constitutional minimum” of habeas review, which requires a 
court to be able to determine if there was an erroneous 
interpretation or application of relevant law.369 
On October 18, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to address the question of whether the INA’s limitations on 
judicial review of expedited removal orders are unconstitutional 
under the Suspension Clause.370 At the time of this writing, the 
case is still pending with the Supreme Court. 
C. The Due Process Challenge to “Metering” Asylum Seekers 
The third situation raising extraterritoriality questions in 
the border enforcement context involves the CBP’s “metering” 
policy. In 2017, the organization Al Otro Lado and a group of 
individual asylum seekers filed a lawsuit challenging 
“metering” and related activities, which they describe as an 
 
 365. See id. at 1113 n.18 (“This test does not clearly fit in the present case, 
given that Thuraissigiam was apprehended and detained in the United 
States.”). 
 366. See id. at 1116 (rejecting the government’s argument that 
Thuraissigiam lacked Suspension Clause protections because he lacked due 
process rights). 
 367. See id. at 1117 (noting that habeas claims were reviewed for both 
statutory and constitutional errors). 
 368. Id. at 1118. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 
2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 427 (Oct. 18, 2019) (No. 19-161). Oral argument 
took place on March 2, 2020. 
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illegal “Turnback Policy.”371 Some of the individual plaintiffs 
were turned back after reaching United States ports of entry, 
while others were turned back before reaching ports of entry 
(the “extraterritorial plaintiffs”).372 The complaint made 
numerous statutory claims, as well as a constitutional due 
process claim.373  
The government responded by filing a motion to dismiss the 
lawsuit.374 Among other things, the government argued that 
“metering” is a lawful policy based on the Executive’s sovereign 
authority to exclude noncitizens from the country, citing a long 
line of plenary power cases dating back to the Chinese Exclusion 
Case.375 Relying on the same plenary power cases, as well as 
Verdugo and Eisentrager, the government further argued that 
“the Fifth Amendment does not apply to aliens outside the 
United States, particularly where they do not allege they have 
any previous voluntary connections to the United States.”376 
 
 371. See Al Otro Lado, Second Amended Complaint, supra note 52, at 80 
(arguing that CBP lacks authority under the INA to turn back noncitizens who 
are seeking admission to the U.S. at a point of entry). 
 372. See id. at 9–17 (recounting plaintiffs’ experiences of coercive practices 
conducted by CBP agents resulting in plaintiffs being turned away from points 
of entry). 
 373. See id. at 88–90 (claiming violation of the right to seek asylum under 
the INA); id. at 90–93 (claiming violation of section 706(1) of the APA); id. at 
93–95 (claiming violation of section 706(2) of the APA); id. at 96–97 (claiming 
CPB’s violation of procedural due process by implementing the Turnback 
Policy). 
 374. See Defendants’ Motion and Notice of Motion to Dismiss at 4, Al Otro 
Lado v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 
3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC), https://perma.cc/RJ8Q-AKCZ (PDF) (arguing in 
part that plaintiffs’ arguments should be dismissed as moot because plaintiffs 
were afforded “the opportunity to be processed as arriving aliens”). 
 375. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Partially 
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 11–12, Al Otro Lado, 327 F. Supp. 
3d 1284 (citing United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 
(1950); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893); Shaughnessy 
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 
408 U.S. 753, 765–67 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)), https://perma.cc/B7Y6-XQ9H (PDF) 
(arguing that “[c]ontrolling the manner and pace of travel across the border” 
is a sovereign prerogative). 
 376. See id. at 18–20  (“[O]ur rejection of extraterritorial application of the 
Fifth Amendment [in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950),] was 
emphatic[.]” (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 
(1990))). 
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Because the extraterritorial plaintiffs had no previous, 
voluntary connection to the United States, the government 
concluded that they had no due process rights.377 Alternatively, 
the government argued that even if procedural due process 
applied to them, it only extended as far as statutory protections, 
and the INA did not protect them.378 
The plaintiffs responded by arguing that due process 
indisputably extends at least as far as statutory rights, and that 
the right to seek asylum under the INA includes noncitizens 
attempting to reach a port of entry who are denied access.379 
Relying on Boumediene, a case that the government’s motion 
completely ignored, the plaintiffs urged that there would be 
nothing “impractical or anomalous” in applying basic due 
process protections at the border.380 They stressed that unlike 
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency’s one-time search 
of a criminal suspect’s home in Verdugo, Border Patrol agents 
“routinely enforce statutes ‘pertaining to activity at or near 
international borders,’” and should therefore be required to 
comply with due process in enforcing those statutes.381 In 
making this argument, the plaintiffs stressed the legislative 
constraints on plenary power.382 What would be impractical and 
anomalous, the plaintiffs concluded, is to “deny asylum seekers 
due process rights because Defendants intentionally intercept 
them just shy of the border in an attempt to manipulate the 
Constitution’s reach.”383 
 
 377. Id. at 21. 
 378. Id. at 21–22. 
 379. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at  
23–24, Al Otro Lado, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC), 
https://perma.cc/36E8-LB8Y (PDF) (arguing that plaintiffs are afforded 
“statutorily-created liberty interests” when attempting to cross the border at 
a point of entry). 
 380. Id. at 24–25. 
 381. Id. at 25 (quoting United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 199 (5th 
Cir. 2005)). 
 382. See id. (“Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims rest squarely within the 
Supreme Court’s longstanding command that ‘[i]n the enforcement of 
[Congress’s] policies [pertaining to the entry of aliens], the Executive 
Branch . . . must respect the procedural safeguards of due process.’” (citing 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 754, 766–67 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 
522, 531 (1954))).  
 383. Id. at 26 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)). 
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In its reply brief, the government finally addressed 
Boumediene, interpreting it narrowly as holding only that the 
Suspension Clause applies to Guantánamo Bay detainees.384 
The government stressed that Boumediene’s holding “turned on 
the writ’s unique role in the separation of powers,” implying that 
due process rights do not play such a role in separation of 
powers.385 It urged the court to rely on “pre-Boumediene law 
holding that the Due Process Clause does not extend to aliens 
without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the 
United States.”386 Alternatively, the government argued that it 
should prevail even under Boumediene’s impractical and 
anomalous test, as the plaintiffs are noncitizens, the United 
States does not have de jure or de facto sovereignty over 
Mexican border towns, and extending the Fifth Amendment to 
Mexican territory would cause friction with Mexico’s 
government.387 
On July 29, 2019, the U.S. District Court issued a order 
granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.388 On the due process issue, the court agreed with the 
plaintiffs, rejecting the government’s territorial argument based 
on Eisentrager and applying Boumediene, which it found 
“squarely rejected bright-line rules regarding the 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution.”389 The court 
also rejected the government’s argument, based on Verdugo, 
that a significant voluntary connection to the United States is 
required to trigger due process rights.390 Relying on the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez, the court reasoned that 
 
 384. See Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Partially Dismissed 
Second Amended Complaint at 13, Al Otro Lado, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (No. 
3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC), https://perma.cc/6ZJW-4RLX (PDF) (“Boumediene 
held only that the Suspension Clause ‘has full effect at Guantanamo Bay’ in 
the specific context of law-of-war detainees who had been detained there for 
years.” (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008))). 
 385. Id. (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 737, 743, 746 (2008)). 
 386. Id. 
 387. See id. at 14–15 (arguing that the extraterritorial concerns raised in 
Boumediene apply to noncitizens presenting themselves at the border in order 
to seek asylum). 
 388. Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 55. 
 389. Id. at 70–71. 
 390. See id. at 71–73 (relying on Rodriguez to dismiss defendants’ 
arguments that Verdugo precludes application of constitutional rights at the 
border). 
EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS 815 
 
connections do “not alone control the question of constitutional 
protection for aliens, particularly when the challenged conduct 
concerns the conduct of U.S. officers acting on U.S. soil.”391 
Since the metering policy was allegedly developed by 
high-level federal officials in the United States, and applied in 
individual cases by CBP officers on United States soil, the court 
found nothing impractical or anomalous about applying due 
process protections.392 Regarding practical necessities, the court 
stressed that “[t]he lesson of Boumediene is that the political 
branches do not enjoy the prerogative to ‘switch the 
Constitution on or off at will.’”393 Because Congress had created 
certain statutory procedures to protect asylum seekers, 
including “arriving aliens,” and the defendants allegedly 
impeded access to this procedure, the court found that practical 
necessities warranted application of the due process clause.394  
V. Disparities in Determining the Reach of Constitutional 
Rights 
The decisions discussed above reflect disparities and 
conflicts in several key areas. This Part examines differences in 
the courts’ selection and application of the Supreme Court’s 
extraterritoriality tests, their approaches to interpreting the 
interaction between those tests and the plenary power doctrine, 
and their use of separation of powers principles as a structural 
constraint, including the role of Boumediene’s 
anti-manipulation principle. 
A. Selection and Application of Extraterritoriality Tests 
The decisions discussed above raise many questions about 
the extraterritoriality tests: Which test or tests should the court 
apply? Does the test depend on the constitutional right at issue? 
Do later tests modify or displace earlier ones? Is a given test 
applied the same way in all situations? These questions, and 
 
 391. Id. at 74. 
 392. See id. at 74–75 (demonstrating that the allegations do not raise 
extraterritorial application concerns). 
 393. Id. at 76 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)). 
 394. See id. at 76 (arguing that CPB agents may not contravene their 
obligations in extending asylum protections). 
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disparities in how courts have answered them, are examined 
below.  
1. Which Extraterritoriality Test(s) Apply? 
Courts are clearly conflicted about which extraterritoriality 
tests to apply under what circumstances. Even before the border 
enforcement cases discussed above, courts followed different 
approaches. In cases pre-dating Boumediene, some courts 
applied the “substantial connections” test to other constitutional 
rights.395 After Boumediene was decided, some courts have 
continued to rely exclusively on Verdugo’s substantial 
connections test,396 while others have relied solely on 
Boumediene’s functional approach.397 Courts also frequently 
combine these tests, effectively treating “substantial 
connections” as a fourth factor that is added to the three-factor 
test in Boumediene.398 In Ibrahim,399 for instance, the Ninth 
Circuit applied both Verdugo’s “substantial connections” test 
and Boumediene’s “functional” test in analyzing whether a 
Malaysian citizen could invoke the protections of the Fifth and 
First Amendments in challenging her inclusion on the “no-fly 
list.”400 In that case, the plaintiff had spent years studying at 
Stanford University before leaving the United States to speak 
 
 395. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 
192, 201–02 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying Verdugo in holding that a foreign 
organization with property in the United States was entitled to a due process 
hearing before the Secretary of State may classify it as a “foreign terrorist 
organization”); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991) (relying on 
Verdugo in holding that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause should 
be applied extraterritorially to government funding of religious schools 
abroad); Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 915–17 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pre-dating 
Verdugo but citing Reid in holding that a Colombian national outside the 
United States was entitled to assert a due process claim against the United 
States government based on seizure of her Swiss bank account). 
 396. See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“Aliens do enjoy certain constitutional rights, but not the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment if they have ‘no previous significant voluntary 
connection with the United States . . . .’” (quoting United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990))). 
 397. See, e.g., supra notes 314–320 and accompanying text. 
 398. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 
(9th Cir. 2012) (characterizing a “significant voluntary connection” to the 
United States). 
   399.     669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012). 
   400.  Id. 
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at a conference abroad that was sponsored by Stanford.401 Based 
on both tests, the Court concluded that Ibrahim had Fifth and 
First Amendment rights.402  
Similar inconsistencies in selecting and applying 
extraterritoriality tests emerge from the border enforcement 
cases examined above. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Hernández I treated Verdugo’s substantial connections test as 
controlling on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.403 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez, on the other hand, 
discussed both Verdugo and Boumediene in analyzing the 
Fourth Amendment claim, relying primarily on the latter 
because it found Verdugo’s substantial connections test to be of 
limited relevance in a case involving a United States border 
patrol agent acting on United States soil.404 This reflects a 
broader problem, namely that the very “concept of 
extraterritoriality becomes less straightforward as events 
straddle borders.”405  
While the Supreme Court’s majority decision in 
Hernández I did not address which test(s) apply in analyzing the 
Fourth Amendment claim, the dissenting opinion by Justice 
Breyer and Justice Ginsburg applied Boumediene and discussed 
Verdugo only in terms of its consideration of practical 
concerns.406 Yet, the dissent then concluded that the culvert 
area where the shooting occurred had “sufficient involvement 
with, and connection to, the United States” for the Fourth 
Amendment to apply, which invoked Verdugo’s substantial 
 
 401. Id. at 988. 
 402. Id. at 997. Significantly, the court found that activities abroad can 
also contribute to forming sufficient connections with the United States. Id.  
 403. See Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (finding 
that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo supports the “substantial 
connections” test). 
 404. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 731 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(determining that the “practical concerns” raised by Verdugo in applying the 
Fourth Amendment are not present when circumstances involve domestic 
conduct). 
 405. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 341, 352 (2014) (describing a cross-border shooting as a “classic 
example” of this problem). 
 406. See Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2010 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the application of the Fourth Amendment would 
avoid anomalies). 
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connections test, suggesting that it may still be relevant.407 The 
Supreme Court’s most recent decision in Hernández II, on the 
other hand, makes no mention of connections of any kind in its 
dicta addressing the relevant test, suggesting that focusing on 
practicalities is what is critical.408 Looking at these decisions 
together, it appears that the Court does not view Verdugo as 
dispositive of all Fourth Amendment claims and that 
Boumediene’s functional approach extends to that context. 
Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Hernández I indicated that the court came to no 
consensus regarding the appropriate test and therefore simply 
avoided reaching the merits of that issue.409 Judge Jones’s 
concurrence reasoned that the Fifth Amendment claim was just 
as thwarted by Eisentrager as the Fourth Amendment claim 
was by Verdugo.410 She interpreted Eisentrager as holding that 
“aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States are 
not entitled to Fifth Amendment rights” and concluded that the 
court was “not at liberty to ‘underrule’ Supreme Court decisions 
when the Court has explicitly failed to overrule its own 
precedents.”411 Accordingly, she rejected the argument that 
Boumediene effectively overruled Eisentrager.412  
Judge Prado’s concurrence, on the other hand, found Judge 
Jones’s opinion to be an “oversimplified and flawed analysis of 
the Fifth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 
extraterritoriality precedents” that “sacrifices nuance for an 
unwarranted sense of certainty.”413 He would have applied 
Boumediene, which he described as a “watershed opinion” that 
“not only authoritatively interpreted these earlier cases but also 
announced the bedrock standards for determining the 
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution—not just the writ of 
habeas corpus.”414 Based on Boumediene’s three-factor test, 
 
 407. Id. at 2011. 
 408. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 754 n.1 (2020). 
 409. See Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 121 (noting that the Court in 
Boumediene “expressly limited its holding to the facts before it”). 
 410. Id. at 126 (Jones, J., concurring). 
 411. Id. 
 412. See id. (focusing on Boumediene’s express holding in rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that Eisentrager was “de facto overruled” by Boumediene’s 
three-part test). 
 413. Id. at 134 (Prado, J., concurring). 
 414. Id. at 136. 
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Judge Prado would have concluded that the Fifth Amendment 
applies had the court reached the merits of that issue.415 “To 
hold otherwise,” he explained, “would enshrine an 
unsustainably strict, territorial approach to constitutional 
rights—one the Supreme Court rejected in Boumediene.”416  
In the expedited removal cases, the Ninth Circuit relied on 
Boumediene. Although, as in Rodriguez, a major part of the 
action (the petitioner’s apprehension and detention) had 
occurred in the United States, Thuraissigiam did not rely on 
that fact in resisting Verdugo’s substantial connections test.417 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Castro mentioned both 
Boumediene and Verdugo, but focused mainly on Plasencia, a 
plenary power case that, like Verdugo, emphasized ties to the 
United States.418 Both Verdugo and Plasencia supported the 
court’s conclusion that physical presence alone, especially of 
short duration, did not trigger constitutional protections.419  
The Third Circuit’s subsequent decision in Osorio-Martinez, 
which involved some of the same child petitioners from Castro 
after they had obtained Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 
confirmed the court’s reliance on Verdugo in Castro.420 However, 
in Osorio-Martinez, the court went through Boumediene’s 
habeas analysis after concluding that the children had 
developed sufficient ties to the United States based on their new 
legal status.421 
In the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in 
Thuraissigiam, both parties relied heavily on Boumediene. The 
 
 415. See id. at 138 (arguing that the Boumediene factors and Fifth 
Amendment analysis “militate in favor of the extraterritorial application of 
substantive due process” rights). 
 416. Id. 
 417. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 
1115 (9th Cir. 2019) (relying on “finality era” precedent to inform 
Boumediene’s step one analysis). 
 418. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 448 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
 419. See id. at 448–50, 448 n.30 (finding that physical presence should 
nevertheless be considered alongside substantial ties when making 
determinations of constitutional rights). 
 420. See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 168 
(3d Cir. 2018) (reviewing the significance of Verdugo’s “substantial 
connections” test in establishing entitlement to constitutional protections). 
 421. Id. at 167–78. 
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government also urged a meaningful ties test, relying on 
Plasencia and citing Verdugo.422 Thuraissigiam countered that 
Boumediene recognized habeas rights for enemy combatants 
with no ties to the United States and that Verdugo did not apply, 
stressing that the case took place wholly on United States 
soil.423 
In Al Otro Lado, the “metering” case, the government and 
plaintiffs sharply disputed which test applied.424 The district 
court concluded that Verdugo’s substantial connections test was 
not controlling because part of the action involved CBP officers 
on United States soil, relying on the reasoning of Rodriguez.425 
Therefore, the court focused on Boumediene, noting its 
repudiation of Eisentrager’s territory-based due process 
analysis.426 In cases like this, where some critical part of the 
action occurred in the United States, there may be overlap 
between Verdugo’s substantial connection test and 
Boumediene’s nature-of-the site factor, but neither Al Otro Lado 
nor any of the other decisions mentioned above discussed or 
explored this possibility. 
Given these inconsistencies in selecting a test, even when 
dealing with very similar factual and legal questions, it is not 
surprising that circuit splits have emerged.427 Clearly, more 
guidance is needed from the Supreme Court. In the meantime, 
the Court’s recent dicta in Hernández rejects the notion of a 
one-to-one correspondence between a specific precedent and a 
particular constitutional right, reinforcing the importance of 
Boumediene’s practical approach outside the habeas context. 
 
 422. Brief for the United States, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 
No. 19-161 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2020), 2019 WL 6727092 at *25 (Dec. 9, 2019). 
 423. Brief of Respondent Vijaykumar Thuraissigiam in Opposition, Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, No. 19-161 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2020), 
2020 WL 353476 at *43, 43 n.18 (Jan. 15, 2020). 
 424. See supra Part IV.C. 
 425. See Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 55, at  
72 – 73 (rejecting defendants’ argument that Verdugo’s “previous voluntary 
significant connection” test effectively limits Fourth Amendment protections 
for noncitizens). 
 426. See id. at 74 (reasoning that application of Eisentrager’s “bright-line 
rule” would be in contravention of Boumediene’s constitutional analysis). 
 427. See supra Part IV. 
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2. How Should the Tests Be Applied? 
The border enforcement cases also show disparate ways of 
applying both the substantial connections test and the 
functional test. One of the main disputes regarding Verdugo is 
whether or how to apply the substantial connections test in 
cases in which a significant part of the action occurred in the 
United States.428 Does that fact alone create a significant 
connection? If the connection involved a United States agent 
acting inside the country, should the court still examine the 
noncitizen’s connections to the United States? In Rodriguez and 
Al Otro Lado, it was not completely clear whether the Border 
Patrol agents’ connections to the United States satisfied the 
substantial connections test or simply rendered it irrelevant. 
One reason for doubting the relevance of the substantial 
connections test when a significant part of the alleged 
constitutional violation occurs inside the United States is 
because of how the Supreme Court framed the issue in Verdugo. 
There, the Court characterized the case as concerning “whether 
the Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by 
United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident 
alien and located in a foreign country.”429 The Court stressed 
that “if there was a constitutional violation, it occurred solely in 
Mexico.”430 Consequently, some courts have refused to apply 
Verdugo to situations where noncitizens alleged Fourth 
Amendment violations that occurred in the United States.431 For 
example, some courts have found Verdugo irrelevant to an 
undocumented immigrant’s motion to exclude evidence 
 
 428. See D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: 
Undocumented Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 
107–08 (2011) (noting how courts have treated similar connections with 
varying degrees of significance when applying Verdugo). 
 429. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
 430. Id. at 264. 
 431. See Núñez, supra note 428, at 103–04 (explaining how Verdugo 
invites courts to limit its holding to violations that occurred outside the United 
States and treat it as irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment rights of 
noncitizens within the country). 
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allegedly obtained from an illegal search that took place in the 
United States.432  
Because Rodriguez and Al Otro Lado did not clearly address 
whether the substantial connections test was satisfied, they 
leave many questions unanswered about how to apply the test 
that could be relevant to future cases. For example, had the 
court in Al Otro Lado chosen to examine the asylum seekers’ 
relationship to the United States, it may have found factors 
supporting a connection based on their compliance with CBP’s 
“metering” rules and efforts to follow United States immigration 
laws. In Martinez–Aguero,433 the Fifth Circuit found that 
“regular and lawful entry of the United States pursuant to a 
valid border-crossing card and . . . acquiescence in the U.S. 
system of immigration constitute[d] voluntary acceptance of 
societal obligations, rising to the level of ‘substantial 
connections.’”434 Similarly, asylum seekers subjected to 
“metering” could argue that they acquiesced to the United 
States system.435 The analogy to Martinez-Aguero would be even 
stronger in a case involving a constitutional challenge to the 
“Remain in Mexico” policy, where asylum seekers are in United 
States removal proceedings and allowed regular entry for their 
court hearings. 
The border enforcement cases discussed above also took 
different approaches with respect to Boumediene’s three-factor 
 
 432. See id. at 104 (noting that the “substantial connection” test under 
Verdugo has been rejected by courts in their determination of Fourth 
Amendment application); see also United States v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917, 919 
(D. Colo. 1992) (rejecting the government’s argument that Verdugo’s holding 
precludes affording Fourth Amendment protections to persons considered to 
be “excludable alien[s]”), rev’d in part on other grounds, aff’d in part, 11 F.3d 
1553 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 916 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998) (“[T]he Court is disinclined to impose a greater burden on [illegal 
immigrants] as a prerequisite to seeking the shelter of the Fourth 
Amendment.”), rev’d on other grounds, No. CR-96-40075-SBA, 1999 WL 
1128650 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1999). But cf. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 
618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether Verdugo’s substantial 
connections test applied but finding that the test was nevertheless satisfied by 
the noncitizen’s prior entries and good faith efforts to comply with United 
States immigration laws). 
 433. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 434. Id. at 625 (emphasis added). 
 435. See id. (finding that Martinez-Aguero’s “periodic visits to assist her 
aunt with retrieving her Social Security check” were “sufficient to confer 
Fourth Amendment rights”). 
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test. In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment applied based on the three-factor test.436 In 
discussing the first Boumediene factor, the Ninth Circuit 
stressed that the agent did not know the victim’s citizenship, 
whereas the Fifth Circuit did not attach any significance to that 
fact in Hernández I.437 The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, however, 
appeared to be based primarily on the third factor related to 
practicalities, as the court found that it would not be impractical 
to apply the Fourth Amendment in a situation where a United 
States agent standing on United States soil used lethal force.438  
Similarly, in Al Otro Lado, the plaintiffs’ argument and the 
district court’s decision focused on the “impractical and 
anomalous” part of Boumediene’s test, rather than the other 
factors, suggesting that some courts may view this as the heart 
of the “functional” test.439 In fact, the court did not mention the 
three-factor test or discuss factors other than practicality at 
all.440 A more detailed analysis of the factors, especially the first 
factor pertaining to status and the adequacy of the process 
through which a status determination is made, could have 
supported the court’s conclusion. Asylum seekers have a special 
status under domestic and international law that distinguishes 
them from other civilian migrants.441 Furthermore, the 
inadequacy of the procedures that culminate in asylum status 
 
 436. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 729–32 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 437. See id. at 733 (finding that decedent’s citizenship was irrelevant in 
determining whether use of deadly force was constitutionally justified); 
Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 137–38 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (showing that the 
question of citizenship only arose in Judge Prado’s concurrence explicating the 
Boumediene three-factor test) 
 438. See Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 748 (contrasting circumstances to a 
hypothetical situation in which an officer used lethal force while fully across 
the border). 
 439. See Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 55, at 71, 
74 (noting plaintiffs are not asking for extraterritorial application of due 
process rights). 
 440. See Al Otro Lado v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1220 (S.D. Cal. 
2019) (discussing practicality in lieu of detailed three-factor analysis). 
 441. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) (2018) (defining “refugee” and 
permitting aliens to seek asylum); Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (establishing 
international law for status of refugees); Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (amending 
Convention to recognize more refugees). 
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determinations, including the “metering” process itself and all 
of the problems related to waitlists discussed in Part II above, 
are relevant to the first factor, but were not discussed by the 
court.442 
While the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam also 
relied heavily on Boumediene, it, too, paid little attention to 
Boumediene’s three-factor test, applying it only in a footnote.443 
There, the court reasoned that those factors “[did] not map 
precisely onto this case because Thuraissigiam was 
apprehended and . . . detained on U.S. soil.”444 As Gerald 
Neuman has noted, the three-factor test is nonexclusive and 
“was tailored to the Suspension Clause and its case law, and 
would presumably need modification to address other rights.”445 
But Thuraissigiam is a Suspension Clause case, suggesting that 
such tailoring may be necessary even when addressing the same 
constitutional right in a new context.446 The court’s analysis of 
the first factor stressed the poor procedural protections in 
credible fear determinations.447 Oddly, the court’s analysis of 
the second factor concluded that the nature of the site “weighed 
strongly” in the petitioner’s favor because he was apprehended 
and detained in the United States, even though the court had 
previously stated that this exact fact rendered the three-factor 
test less relevant to the case.448  
An interesting gap is that none of the border enforcement 
decisions paid much attention to the history, geography, and 
control of the border region in discussing the “nature of the site” 
factor.449 Judge Prado’s initial decision in Hernández, prior to 
 
 442. See Al Otro Lado, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1220 (omitting analysis of 
procedural inadequacies). 
 443. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1113 
n.18 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 444. Id. at 1108. 
 445. Neuman, supra note 225, at 287. 
 446. See Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1104–12 (discussing the Suspension 
Clause). 
 447. See id. at 1113 n.18 (“[H]allmarks of the adversarial process are 
lacking.”). 
 448. See id. (distinguishing Boumediene because of extraterritoriality, but 
then finding that detention in United States “weighs strongly” for second 
factor analysis). 
 449. See Eva L. Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution 
and Foreign Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
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rehearing en banc, provided the most detailed analysis of the 
border region itself.450 Judge Prado reasoned that even though 
the United States did not exercise de jure or de facto sovereignty 
over the Mexican side of the border, “the heavy presence and 
regular activity of federal agents across a permanent border 
without any shared accountability weigh in favor of recognizing 
some constitutional reach.”451 He noted that border patrol 
agents “act on or occasionally even across the border they 
protect,”452 and recognized that border protection policies 
“expand U.S. control beyond the nation’s territorial borders,” 
such as the “pre-inspection” examinations that CBP conducts in 
foreign countries and at sea.453  
Judge Prado’s decision also raised two other relevant 
considerations in assessing the nature of a site. First, he 
brought up the duration of United States involvement in the 
location, noting the “long history of United States involvement 
beyond the U.S.-Mexico border.”454 He contrasted the United 
States government’s transient control over the Landsberg 
Prison in Eisentrager with the role of Border Patrol agents, 
whom he described as “repeat players in a ‘constant’ border 
relationship.”455 Second, he raised the issue of accountability to 
the authority in control of the site. He again distinguished 
Eisentrager, where the Landsberg jailers were accountable to 
Allied authorities, from the border region, where United States 
border patrol agents are not accountable to the Mexican 
government.456 Neither of the Fifth Circuit’s subsequent 
 
229, 244–47 (2014) (discussing the nature of the site by providing a historical 
perspective of United States action in the border region). 
 450. See Hernández v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 270 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 451. Hernández, 757 F.3d at 270.  
 452. Id. at 269. 
 453. Id. at 270 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b) (2019); Ayelet Shachar, The 
Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165, 174–77 
(2007)). 
 454. Id. (citing Bitran, supra note 449, at 244–47). 
 455. Id. at 270 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 768–69 (2008)). 
 456. Id. 
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decisions in Hernández I and Hernández II analyzed the border 
region in such detail.457 
3. Does the Nature of the Right Matter? 
The decisions discussed above also reflect confusion about 
whether a precedent pertaining to one constitutional right may 
be applied to another right. For example, in Hernández II, Judge 
Jones thought Verdugo controlled the Fourth Amendment issue, 
Eisentrager controlled the Fifth Amendment due process issue, 
and Boumediene was irrelevant because it involved the right to 
habeas corpus.458 This perspective represents one extreme, with 
a single precedent mapping onto a specific right. Other judges 
have shown much greater flexibility in applying the various 
tests to different rights and have treated Eisentrager as 
effectively overruled by the later cases.459  
A helpful way to understand these decisions is to examine 
more generally whether the court considered the fundamental 
nature of a right. As explained in Part III, one of the Supreme 
Court’s early approaches to extraterritoriality involved 
extending only constitutional rights deemed “fundamental” to 
unincorporated territories, and commentators have observed 
that both Verdugo and Boumediene implicitly considered 
whether the right at issue was fundamental.460 Some of the 
border enforcement decisions discussed above also implicitly or 
explicitly considered a right’s fundamental nature, which helps 
explain the circuit splits.461 The cases that explored the 
fundamental nature of the right at issue came out in the 
 
 457. Compare id. (offering detailed discussion of border region), with 
Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), and Hernández II, 
885 F.3d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (lacking similar analysis). 
 458. See Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 122–28 (Jones, J., concurring) (rejecting 
argument that Boumediene effectively overruled Eisentrager). 
 459. See id. at 136 (Prado, J., concurring) (criticizing Judge Jones’s 
“uncomplicated view of extraterritoriality”). 
 460. See Neuman, supra note 225, at 286 (noting Justice Kennedy’s view 
on the Suspension Clause rights of foreign nationals in United States custody); 
Lobel, supra note 209, at 335 (claiming that Boumediene “relied heavily on 
fundamental rights principles”); Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, 
Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 466 
(2010) (discussing analysis from Verdugo and Boumediene). 
 461. See, e.g., Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 119–21 (majority opinion) (omitting 
mention of the nature of the right at issue). 
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noncitizens’ favor, while those that did not refused to extend 
constitutional protections.462 
In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit implicitly considered the 
fundamental nature of a right against summary execution, 
while the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in Hernández did not.463 In 
finding that Border Patrol Agent Swartz was not entitled to 
qualified immunity, the Rodriguez court reasoned that anyone 
would know that a “gratuitous” killing committed “for no 
reason” is unlawful “without a judicial decision to tell him so,” 
and called it an “obvious case” of excessive force.464 
Furthermore, although the court did not analyze the Fifth 
Amendment substantive due process claim, it stated in dicta 
that Swartz’s conduct would fail the “shocks the conscience” 
test, because the “cold-blooded murder of an innocent person 
walking down the street in Mexico or Canada” would shock the 
conscience of “anyone.”465 These remarks invoke the prohibition 
against extrajudicial killing, which is a non-derogable norm of 
international law.466 
The Fifth Circuit’s majority decisions in Hernández I and 
Hernández II, on the other hand, did not refer, even implicitly, 
to fundamental rights, even though the case also involved a 
summary execution.467 However, Judge Prado’s dissent in 
Hernández II explained that he “would not so readily abdicate 
our judicial role given the fundamental rights at stake here.”468 
 
 462. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (permitting 
Bivens claim by noncitizen); Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 119–21 (denying 
noncitizen Bivens claim). 
 463. Compare Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 733 (asking “whether it was clearly 
established that it was unconstitutional . . . to use deadly force without 
justification against a person of unknown nationality on the other side of the 
border”), with Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 119–21 (lacking discussion of 
extrajudicial killing). 
 464. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 733–34. 
 465. Id. at 734. 
 466. See Lobel, supra note 209, at 310 (recognizing prohibitions on 
extrajudicial execution to be “so fundamental as to be non-derogable under 
any circumstances”). 
 467. See Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 119–21 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc); 
Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 814–23 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (lacking 
consideration of the nature of rights). 
 468. Hernández II, 885 F.3d at 829 (Prado, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
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Similarly, in the expedited removal cases, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam considered the fundamental 
nature of habeas.469 The court quoted Boumediene’s description 
of habeas as a “fundamental” right and emphasized its historical 
importance.470 It also found that plenary power concerns could 
not “overwhelm the ‘fundamental procedural protections of 
habeas corpus . . . a right of first importance.’”471 This approach 
recognizes that the Great Writ protects the fundamental right 
against prolonged detention without judicial review, which is 
also a non-derogable norm under international law.472 
By contrast, the Third Circuit’s decision in Castro did not 
discuss the fundamental nature of habeas review at all.473 
Approaching the case from a plenary power perspective and 
applying precedents involving due process clouded the 
centrality of the petitioners’ habeas claim. In fact, the court 
repeatedly referred to the plenary power to exclude as a 
“fundamental sovereign attribute,” without once describing 
habeas as a fundamental right.474 Although the court recognized 
the fundamental nature of due process in quoting cases such as 
Yamataya, it construed Yamataya narrowly as excluding “very 
recent clandestine entrants.”475  
Furthermore, the district court’s decision in Al Otro Lado 
explicitly discussed non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm, 
thereby recognizing its status as a fundamental right under 
international law.476 As part of their claim under the ATS, the 
plaintiffs specifically asserted that CBP’s denial or delays in 
giving noncitizens access to the asylum process violated the jus 
 
 469. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 
1113 – 15, 1119 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 470. Id. 
 471. Id. at 1119 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)). 
 472. See Lobel, supra note 209, at 310 (listing prohibitions against 
prolonged arbitrary detention without judicial review as another 
non-derogable norm in international law). 
 473. See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 424–50 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (omitting discussion of nature of habeas rights). 
 474. See id. at 439, 444 (describing the plenary power to exclude 
noncitizens as a “fundamental sovereign attribute”). 
 475. Id. at 442 n.21. 
 476. See Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1224 (S.D. 
Cal. 2019) (“Defendants simply fail to grapple with Plaintiffs’ allegations or 
arguments on whether non-refoulement is a norm that is recognized by the law 
of nations.”). 
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cogens norm of non-refoulement.477 Because the government did 
not address this contention, the court found that it had conceded 
that violation of non-refoulement is an actionable claim.478 
Although the due process claim was distinct from the ATS claim, 
the core of the violation for both causes of action is deprivation 
of access to an asylum process designed to protect the 
fundamental right of non-refoulement. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting that the court did not acknowledge the fundamental 
nature of due process, which has been recognized for the past 
century.479  
In short, these cases suggest that consideration of whether 
a right is fundamental, even implicitly, has the power to shape 
a court’s extraterritoriality analysis and potentially influence 
the outcome. 
4. Proposal for a Composite Test 
One approach that would help address the questions raised 
above, provide some normative guidance, and be firmly rooted 
in precedents is a composite test that combines key aspects of 
the substantial connections, functionary, and fundamental 
rights approaches in a generally applicable and adaptable 
manner.480 This composite test would involve considering: (1) 
the citizenship and status of the individual alleging a 
constitutional violation and the adequacy of the process through 
 
 477. See id. at 1222 (outlining ATS claims); see also Alien Tort Statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (2018) (offering civil remedy for torts committed in violation of 
international law). 
 478. See Al Otro Lado, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1224 n.14 (explaining denial of 
motion to dismiss). 
 479. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922) (distinguishing 
the right to a jury trial from “certain fundamental personal rights declared in 
the Constitution, as for instance that no person could be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process”). 
 480. Shawn Fields has also suggested the possibility of a test that 
combines the Boumediene factors with other factors, but ultimately proposes 
a “unified theory of constitutional extraterritoriality” that involves (1) 
universal extraterritorial application of fundamental constitutional equality 
norms; and (2) extraterritorial application of fundamental substantive liberty 
interests and procedural due process interests, both of which would be 
moderated by foreign policy and other practical considerations. Shawn E. 
Fields, From Guantanamo to Syria: The Extraterritorial Constitution in the 
Age of “Extreme Vetting,” 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1123, 1174–89 (2018). 
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which that status determination was made or is being made; (2) 
the nature of the site where the alleged constitutional violation 
occurred, including the level of United States government 
involvement in the site; (3) the practical obstacles inherent in 
recognizing the constitutional right; (4) the degree of 
connections that the person alleging the violations, or the 
violation itself, has to the United States; and (5) the 
fundamental nature of the right at issue.  
The first three factors are simply more generalized 
statements of the Boumediene factors. The first factor would 
allow consideration of immigration status, including whether 
someone is an asylum seeker, as well as the adequacy of the 
process for seeking that status. This would allow courts to take 
into consideration, for example, any concerns about the 
processes of “metering,” “Remain in Mexico,” and expedited 
removal, through which status determinations are made.  
The second factor regarding the nature of the site explicitly 
mentions considering the level of United States involvement in 
the site to emphasize that this factor is not limited to examining 
whether there is de facto or de jure control. Thus, the level of 
United States involvement in the U.S.-Mexico border region, 
which both Justice Breyer and Judge Prado highlighted in their 
respective dissents,481 would be considered under the second 
factor.  
 The third factor reflects the practical concerns significant 
to both Boumediene and Verdugo. This factor may deserve 
special weight because it goes to the heart of those decisions and 
contemplates the unique circumstances of each case.  
 The fourth factor captures Verdugo’s focus on connections 
to the United States but takes a broader perspective, allowing 
consideration of not only the individual’s connections but also 
any connections that the alleged violation itself may have to this 
country. This would include where the alleged violation occurred 
and who committed the violation, which would help evaluate 
 
 481. See Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2010 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“The United States and Mexico have jointly agreed to maintain 
the Rio Grande and jointly to maintain the ‘limitrophe’ areas.” (citing Treaty 
to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and 
Colorado River as the International Boundary art. IV, Nov. 23, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 
390)); Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 828 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Prado, J., 
dissenting). 
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incidents where part or all of the action occurred on United 
States soil.  
 Finally, the fifth factor would make explicit the 
consideration about fundamental rights that is implicit in 
Boumediene and Verdugo and that appears to influence the 
border enforcement cases discussed above. 
Alternatively, if courts did not want to add more factors to 
the Boumediene framework, they could simply take Verdugo 
into account by interpreting the first factor’s reference to a 
person’s status to incorporate, inter alia, the degree of 
connection to the United States. Courts could also account for 
the connections that the alleged violation had to the United 
States under Boumediene’s second factor regarding the nature 
of the site, instead of considering it as part of the proposed 
fourth factor. Thus, if part of the violation occurred on United 
States soil, that would be considered as part of the nature of the 
site. This alternative approach would allow courts to stick more 
closely to the Boumediene test while still facilitating its 
application to a broader array of situations, including in the 
border enforcement context. 
B. The Role of Plenary Power 
The border enforcement cases discussed above also reflect 
disparate and conflicting interpretations of the relationship 
between the plenary power doctrine and the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional extraterritoriality jurisprudence. At least three 
different approaches emerge from these decisions. First, courts 
may treat one doctrine as trumping the other. Second, courts 
may be influenced by the plenary power as an implicit deference 
doctrine, even if they do not discuss it explicitly. Third, courts 
may stress the legislative constraints on the plenary power in 
order to avoid competing constitutional outcomes. Each of these 
approaches is discussed further below. 
1. Plenary Power as a Trump Card 
In the expedited removal cases, the Third and Ninth Circuit 
sharply disagreed about the relevance of the plenary power. The 
Third Circuit’s analysis in Castro started and ended with the 
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plenary power doctrine.482 Once the court decided to apply the 
“entry fiction” rationale to individuals in expedited removal 
proceedings who had been apprehended after entering the 
United States, treating them as if they were outside seeking 
admission, plenary power dictated the outcome by rendering 
decisions pertaining to the exclusion of noncitizens largely 
immune from judicial review. Because the court simply 
extended the reasoning of Plasencia, a due process case 
involving a returning permanent resident, to hold that there 
was no constitutional right to habeas, it never engaged in an 
extraterritoriality analysis under Boumediene’s functional 
approach.483 Thus, the Third Circuit applied the plenary power 
as a trump card, at least in the case of noncitizens categorized 
by the court as seeking initial admission and having no 
substantial connection to the United States. 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Thuraissigiam, on the other 
hand, began with Boumediene’s approach to analyzing habeas 
cases and focused on the history of the writ.484 In rejecting the 
Third Circuit’s reliance on Plasencia, the court stressed that 
habeas and due process are distinct constitutional provisions 
with different historical origins and should not be conflated.485 
The court also rejected the government’s reliance on Mezei, 
reasoning that Mezei was treated as someone standing at the 
border only for due process purposes, and that Mezei “otherwise 
affirmed the principle that habeas is available even when a 
petitioner lacks due process rights.”486 The court concluded that 
 
 482. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 439–50 (explaining and applying the plenary 
power doctrine). 
 483. See id. at 445 (“The reason Petitioner’s Suspension Clause claim fails 
at step one is because the Supreme Court has unequivocally concluded that 
‘an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege 
and has no constitutional rights regarding his application.’” (citing Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982))). 
 484. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 
1104–08 (9th Cir. 2018) (beginning Suspension Clause analysis with 
discussion of history of the writ and Boumediene). 
 485. Id. at 1111–12 (citing Lee Kovarsky, Custodial and Collateral 
Process: A Response to Professor Garrett, 98 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 
(2013); Mary Van Houten, The Post-Boumediene Paradox: Habeas Corpus or 
Due Process?, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 10 (2014); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the 
War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2007)). 
 486. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1115 (citing Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953)). 
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“[p]lenary power concerns cannot in all circumstances 
overwhelm the ‘fundamental procedural protections of habeas 
corpus . . . a right of first importance.’”487 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the application of plenary power as some type 
of trump card and even suggested that the Great Writ may 
trump the plenary power.  
Given that several plenary power cases, including Knauff 
and Mezei, recognized a right to habeas, even though they 
refused to extend due process rights, it may be that with respect 
to this particular right at least, the Ninth Circuit has a point.488 
However, it is not clear that the Ninth Circuit would have 
reached a different conclusion in analyzing the relationship 
between due process and plenary power, despite the distinctions 
it drew between due process and habeas, since the court rejected 
the notion that the petitioner “lack[ed] all procedural due 
process rights.”489 Nor is it clear that one doctrine must “trump” 
another to resolve conflicts in their interaction. As explained 
below, there are other ways to understand their relationship.  
2. Plenary Power as an Implicit Deference Doctrine 
Another way the plenary power can influence courts is as 
an implicit deference doctrine. As explained in Part III, the 
plenary power has its roots in norms of deference to the political 
branches.490 Ernesto Hernández-López has argued that the 
plenary power can act as a “fallback doctrine” even in cases that 
do not involve immigration law, resulting in the denial of 
 
 487. Id. at 1119 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008)). 
 488. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) 
(stating that the petitioner was “doubtless[ly]” entitled to habeas corpus even 
though the 1891 Immigration Act prevented review of immigration decisions); 
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543–44 (1950) 
(reviewing Knauff’s habeas petition despite concluding that the Due Process 
Clause did not apply); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 
206, 213 (1953) (recognizing that Mezei “may by habeas corpus challenge the 
validity of his exclusion”). 
 489. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1111 n.15. 
 490. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 154–59 (2002) 
(describing Supreme Court plenary power decisions). 
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remedies.491 He contends that judicial decisions allowing the 
indefinite detention of Uighurs in Guantánamo are ostensibly 
about habeas release, but actually reflect “traditional plenary 
power norms” of “deferring to the [E]xecutive and limiting alien 
rights.”492 
Similarly, the plenary power functions as an implicit 
deference doctrine in the cross-border shooting cases, which do 
not involve immigration law but do involve noncitizens located 
outside the United States. Although the context is totally 
different from Uighurs in Guantánamo, the rejection of judicial 
remedies based on norms of deference to the political branches 
is the same. In refusing to extend a Bivens remedy, the Fifth 
Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Hernández II 
introduced traditional plenary power norms through their 
analyses of whether the case presented a “new context” and 
involved “special factors.”  
  In concluding that “special factors” existed, the Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that extending Bivens threatened the political 
branches’ supervision of national security and risked interfering 
with foreign affairs and diplomacy more generally.493 Since the 
Executive Branch had refused to indict Mesa and denied his 
extradition to Mexico, the court noted that it could undermine 
the validity of the Executive Branch’s prior determinations if a 
federal court entered a damages judgment against Mesa.494  
 The Supreme Court’s decision affirming the Fifth Circuit 
applied norms of deference to both parts of the Bivens analysis. 
The Court found that a cross-border shooting presents a “new 
context” because it involves a significant risk of “‘disruptive 
intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other 
branches.’”495 Along the same lines, the Court reasoned that 
special factors existed because the expansion of Bivens would 
impinge on foreign relations, an area entrusted to the political 
 
 491. Ernesto Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo and Immigration 
Law: An Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World, 2 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 193, 194–95, 204–05 (2012). 
 492. Id. at 224. 
 493. Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 818–19 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 494. See id. at 820 (pointing to prior diplomacy between the United States 
and Mexican governments). 
 495. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 734, 744 (2020) (quoting Ziglar v. 
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017)). 
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branches and largely immune from judicial review.496 
Additionally, the Court identified border security and 
Congress’s decision not to allow damages suits in other contexts 
as other special factors, concluding that all of these factors boil 
down to a concern for respecting separation of powers.497 
 Although the Court never explicitly mentioned the plenary 
power doctrine, it set the tone by quoting Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy,498 a key case in the development of that 
doctrine.499  In fact, Harisiades provides an extreme example of 
the operation of the plenary power doctrine, as it affirmed the 
deportation of permanent residents based solely on former 
membership in the Communist party, reasoning that it would 
be “rash and irresponsible . . . to qualify the Government’s power 
of deportation.”500 
By contrast, the dissenting opinions at the Fifth Circuit and 
Supreme Court, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Rodriguez, framed the case as an ordinary incident of excessive 
force by an officer, rejecting the relevance of deferential norms. 
Judge Prado’s dissent at the Fifth Circuit argued that the 
majority had been “led astray from the familiar circumstances 
of this case by empty labels of national security, foreign affairs, 
and extraterritoriality.”501 He noted that the same concerns 
raised by the majority about foreign affairs and diplomacy exist 
when a noncitizen is injured within the United States.502 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez viewed the 
case as an ordinary law enforcement issue involving the 
unprovoked use of lethal force.503  
 
 496. Id. at 744–50. 
 497. Id. at 749–50. 
   498.    342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
 499. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 744 (quoting Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589, 
which states that matters relating “to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are 
so exclusively trusted to the political branches of government as to be largely 
immune from judicial review); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a 
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory 
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 558–60 (1990) (explaining the role of 
Harisiades in the plenary power doctrine). 
 500. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591. 
 501. Hernández II, 885 F.3d at 825 (Prado, J., dissenting). 
 502. Id. at 829. 
 503. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 745 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Hernández II followed 
Rodriguez in framing the issue as “the rogue actions of a 
rank-and-file law enforcement officer,” rather than a matter 
related to foreign policy and national security.504 She pointed 
out that courts routinely address numerous border-related 
issues concurrently with whatever diplomacy may be 
happening, and that in this particular case, Mexico supported 
judicial intervention.505 Far from considering the situation one 
immune from judicial review, Justice Ginsburg stressed the 
need for a judicial remedy.506  
 Hernández II provides an example of how plenary power 
norms can creep into a case that has nothing to do with 
immigration law in contexts involving noncitizens, especially 
when they are outside the country. The influence of plenary 
power as an implicit deference doctrine creates a risk of unfairly 
limiting rights and remedies in situations where deference to 
the political branches is not actually required and where the 
only possible redress may come from the judiciary. The more 
severe the constitutional violations involved, the more risky it 
is for courts to implicitly invoke plenary power norms. 
3. Plenary Power as Subject to Legislative and Constitutional 
Constraints 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the plenary 
power is subject to legislative and constitutional constraints.507 
Thus, a third approach is to construe the plenary power as 
limited by the INA, another relevant statute, or the 
Constitution, thereby avoiding conflicting interpretations that 
arise from application of the plenary power and 
extraterritoriality doctrines.  
The district court followed this approach in Al Otro Lado. 
There, the government had argued that the plenary power was 
 
 504. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 505. Id. at 758. 
 506. Id. at 760. 
 507. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415 (2018) (upholding 
the President’s Proclamation as “squarely within the scope of the President’s 
authority under the INA”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 
(1893) (“The power to exclude or to expel aliens . . . is vested in the political 
departments of the government . . . except so far the judicial department has 
been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law 
of the constitution, to intervene.” (emphasis added)).  
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a trump card that defeated the extraterritorial plaintiffs’ due 
process claim.508 The government also relied on plenary power 
as an implicit deference doctrine in claiming that the case 
involved a nonjusticiable political question, because managing 
“the flow of travel across the border” implicated foreign 
affairs.509 In rejecting both of these arguments, the district court 
reasoned that it was not ruling on the wisdom of discretionary 
immigration or foreign policy decisions, but rather had to 
determine whether the “metering” policy was consistent with 
the INA.510 Accordingly, the court stressed the legislative 
constraints on plenary power, explaining that “[f]ederal courts 
have the power to ‘review the political branches’ action to 
determine whether they exceed the constitutional or statutory 
scope of their authority.’”511 Because the court had found that 
plaintiffs’ statutory challenges to “metering” survived the 
government’s motion to dismiss, and due process extended at 
least as far as the INA’s statutory protections for asylum 
seekers, it rejected the plenary power arguments.512 
Similarly, the Third Circuit’s decision in Osorio-Martinez, 
which involved some of the same child petitioners from Castro 
after they obtained Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 
emphasized the numerous procedural protections established by 
Congress for individuals with this status.513 The court then 
concluded that “[i]n these circumstances, the plenary power of 
the political departments does not preclude invocation of the 
 
 508. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Partially 
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 11–12, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. 
McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-
KSC). 
 509. See id. at 28 (citing Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588 – 89, and referencing 
the plenary power cases previously cited). 
 510. See Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1192 (S.D. 
Cal. 2019) (“We must decide only whether Executive Order No. 12807, which 
reflects and implements those [immigration policy] choices, is consistent with 
§ 243(h) of the INA.” (citations omitted)). 
 511. Id. at 1191–92 (quoting E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 
F.3d 1219, 1232 (9th Cir. 2018)). 
 512. See id. at 1193 (rejecting political question doctrine challenge). 
 513. See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 176 
(3d Cir. 2018) (“As SIJ designees, Petitioners have . . . been accorded an array 
of significant statutory rights and procedural protections by Congress . . . .”). 
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Suspension Clause.”514 Indeed, the court went even further, 
stating, “if anything, [the plenary power] cuts the other way,” 
since “[i]nsulating expedited orders from judicial 
review . . . hardly accords respect to Congress’s wide-ranging 
authority in the immigration realm.”515 In other words, because 
Congress had “marshaled” the plenary power to protect children 
with Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, not to deprive them of 
procedural protections, the court’s job was to enforce the rights 
granted by Congress.516 
While these decisions turned on the legislative constraints 
on the plenary power, the Supreme Court has also long 
recognized that this power is subject to certain constitutional 
constraints.517 Accordingly, in an amicus brief to the Supreme 
Court in Thuraissigiam, legal scholars argued “[t]he Suspension 
Clause and its guarantee of access to the writ of habeas corpus 
is just such a constitutional limitation on the Congress’s plenary 
power.”518  
This type of argument may be more complicated in cases in 
which the proposed constitutional limitation is due process, 
since the plenary power cases explicitly address due process 
rights. Nevertheless, the Court has recognized due process 
constraints on the plenary power in certain situations, and one 
could argue that the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence 
imposes further constitutional constraints on that power. For 
example, if the statutory challenges to the “Remain in Mexico” 
policy ultimately fail, one could argue that the plenary power 
 
 514. Id. 
 515. Id. (emphasis added). 
 516. See id. at 176–77 (noting that Petitioners were only seeking to 
“enforce the very rights and [judicial] review that Congress did grant”). 
 517. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (stating that the 
plenary power is “subject to important constitutional limitations”); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983) (explaining that it is the province of the 
courts to decide “whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible 
means of implementing [the plenary] power”); Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (stating that Congress’s plenary power over 
immigration is limited “by the Constitution itself”); Hernández v. Sessions, 
872 F.3d 976, 990 n.17 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that “the Due Process 
Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the political 
branches may exercise their authority” (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695)). 
 518. Brief for Scholars of the Law of Habeas Corpus as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, ___ 
U.S.  ___, 2020 WL 402705 at *13 (Jan. 22, 2020).  
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does not preclude plaintiffs in Mexico from invoking due process 
protections because extraterritorial cases like Verdugo and 
Boumediene constitutionally constrain its application.519  
It is critical for courts to consider these legislative and 
constitutional constraints on the plenary power carefully, and 
to construe them broadly, in order to preserve the judicial 
review necessary to check executive authority, protect basic 
rights, and prevent the creation of a lawless border region where 
constitutional constraints do not apply. 
C. Separation of Powers and the Anti-Manipulation Principle 
The cases in Part IV also raise important questions about 
the application of Boumediene’s arguments for protecting 
separation of powers in the border enforcement context. In 
Boumediene, the Court wanted to ensure that the political 
branches could not “switch the Constitution on or off at will,” 
which would “permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system 
of government.”520 This means that the Judicial Branch must be 
able to define the limits of the political branches’ power.521 The 
Court was particularly concerned about the political branches 
being able to manipulate jurisdiction in order to evade judicial 
review.522 The Court refused to allow the political branches to 
manipulate geography, by acquiring or disposing of territory, in 
a way that would allow “Congress and the President, not this 
Court, to say ‘what the law is.’”523 This concern over 
manipulation was not unfounded, as the Court had heard about 
 
 519. See, e.g., Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 506 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (challenging DHS’s “Remain in Mexico” policy under 8 
U.S.C. § 1225 (2018)). 
 520. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008). 
 521. See Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and 
Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25 
CONST. COMMENT. 377, 396–97 (2009) (breaking down Boumediene’s 
separation of powers argument into three principles: an external limit 
principle, judicial enforcement principle, and anti-manipulation principle). 
 522. Id. at 378, 397 n.89 (arguing that Boumediene is a case about 
separation of powers and distinguishing Boumediene’s anti-manipulation 
principle and its focus on evading judicial review from concerns about 
manipulating jurisdiction to favor or disfavor particular rights). 
 523. Boumediene, 522 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
137, 177 (1803)). 
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“legal strategies designed by the Executive to evade the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts and constraints of law.”524 The Court 
therefore developed a test for determining the scope of a 
constitutional right that would “not be subject to manipulation 
by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”525 Some 
commentators have argued that Boumediene’s separation of 
powers analysis, especially its ground-breaking 
anti-manipulation principle, is one the most critical 
contributions of the case.526  
Boumediene’s forceful arguments for judicial review are 
useful in construing the relationship between extraterritoriality 
analysis and plenary power. The same concerns about 
preventing the political branches from having unlimited power, 
and preserving the judiciary’s role in providing oversight, weigh 
in favor of constraining the plenary power and allowing courts 
to exercise some level of judicial review, especially when it 
comes to constitutional claims. Otherwise, reflexively deferring 
to the political branches’ plenary power over immigration allows 
them to determine (and manipulate) the scope of the 
Constitution’s limits on their own power. 
As explained below, the Constitution’s textual ambiguity 
regarding its extraterritorial reach underscores the need for 
structural principles, such as separation of powers, to act as a 
check on the political branches and prevent their manipulation 
of constitutional rights. Specifically, the border enforcement 
cases reflect concern for at least two types of manipulation: 
manipulation of the border as a legal construct, and 
 
 524. Azmy, supra note 460, at 468. 
 525. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 727. But see Lobel, supra note 8, at 1651 
(arguing that Boumediene’s “functional test is disconnected from the 
separation of powers discussion that preceded its articulation, and it virtually 
ignores the separation-of-powers concerns that were central to the Court’s 
analysis of the Suspension Clause”). 
 526. See Azmy, supra note 460, at 466–72 (unpacking Boumediene’s 
“anti-manipulation principle”); Katz, supra note 521, at 396–97, 399 (distilling 
three principles of separation of powers from Boumediene); Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of 
Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111 (2009) (stating that Boumediene 
“appears to be as much about preserving the role of the courts as it is about 
protecting the individual rights of litigants”); Marc D. Falkoff & Robert 
Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
851, 879 (2010) (observing that Boumediene’s “approach emphasized not 
rights, but limitations”). 
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manipulation of national security as an illusory threat, both of 
which are discussed below. 
1. Textual Ambiguity and the Need for Structural Checks 
One of the reasons that structural principles, such as 
separation of powers, are particularly important in analyzing 
the extraterritorial reach of constitutional rights is because the 
Constitution’s text leaves many questions of extraterritoriality 
unresolved.527 Certain rights, such as those in Article IV’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, explicitly apply only to 
citizens who reside within state territories.528 Some scholars 
have also interpreted the Supremacy Clause, which refers to the 
“supreme Law of the Land,”529 and the Preamble, which begins, 
“We the People of the United States,”530 to limit the 
Constitution’s protections to individuals physically present in 
the country.531 However, others have observed that “most of the 
Constitution’s provisions are not textually restricted by either 
population or geography. Instead, they define the general 
 
 527. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 
515, 530–32, 593–94 (2009) (“The Framers of the Constitution did not speak 
very clearly at all with regard to the relationship between territory and 
constitutional scope.”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: 
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary 
Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (2002) (“Questions about the 
geographic and popular scope of the Constitution were . . . not readily resolved 
by the Constitution’s text); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as 
Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 11, 23–24 (1985) (noting that no court since Reid “has suggested that any 
constitutional provision is inapplicable because the challenged conduct 
occurred in a foreign country”); J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case 
Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 481 (2007) (criticizing 
“globalist” interpretations of the Constitution’s silence about scope); Kal 
Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2517–20 
(2005) (discussing history of “legal spatiality” in the United States 
Constitution). 
 528. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); 
see also id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or [shall any state] deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 529. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 530. Id. pmbl. 
 531. See Kent, supra note 527, at 466 (analyzing the text and history of 
the Constitution in regards to extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights). 
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powers of the national government or impose general limits on 
the exercise of those powers.”532 
This textual ambiguity permeates the cross-border cases 
discussed above, appearing as inconsistent interpretation or 
simply avoidance of the constitutional text. In Verdugo, Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion specifically contrasted the words “the 
people” in the Fourth Amendment, which he interpreted as 
limiting its reach to the people of the United States, with the 
language of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which 
respectively refer to “no person” and “the accused.”533 One would 
think, then, that in cases involving Fifth Amendment claims, 
like Hernández, the language of the Due Process Clause would 
weigh in favor of extending the right extraterritorially.534 
However, the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decisions in Hernández I 
and Hernández II never addressed the text of the Due Process 
Clause. 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision to avoid addressing the relevant 
Constitutional text during rehearing en banc is especially 
interesting given that Judge Prado’s initial decision in 
Hernández, prior to rehearing en banc, provided a thoughtful 
textual analysis of the Fifth Amendment.535 Judge Prado 
specifically contrasted the unqualified language of the Due 
Process Clause with Constitutional provisions that explicitly 
impose territorial constraints,536 such as the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which states that “Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.”537 For further support, Judge 
Prado cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cannatella,538 which 
found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied to “excludable aliens” because “excludable 
 
 532. Cleveland, supra note 527, at 19. 
 533. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264–65 (1990).  
 534. See Hernández v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 267 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the appellant’s Fifth Amendment claim). 
 535. See id. at 267–72 (looking to the text of the Fifth Amendment to 
determine the Amendment’s extraterritorial application). 
 536. See id. at 262 (“Not all constitutional provisions will have equal 
extraterritorial application, if any. Some contain geographical references, but 
others do not.”). 
 537. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1). 
 538. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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aliens are not non-persons.”539 The textual difference between 
the Fifth and Fourth Amendments alone led Judge Prado to 
conclude that Verdugo’s sufficient connections test did not apply 
to the Fifth Amendment claim.540 Nevertheless, the Fifth 
Circuit did not address the text of the Due Process Clause 
during rehearing en banc. 
The Suspension Clause cases provide another interesting 
example where consideration of the constitutional text has been 
selective. In both Boumediene and I.N.S v. St. Cyr,541 the 
dissents authored by Justice Scalia argued that the text of the 
Suspension Clause did not support the Court’s conclusion that 
it applied to the noncitizens in those cases.542 In St. Cyr, Justice 
Scalia’s dissent stressed that the Suspension Clause “does not 
guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of 
habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not 
(except in cases of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.”543 In 
Boumediene, Justice Scalia’s dissent relied on the same 
interpretation of the Suspension Clause as in St. Cyr.544  
Yet Judge Rogers’s dissent in the lower court’s decision in 
Boumediene, which reached the opposite conclusion from 
Justice Scalia, also relied on the Suspension Clause’s text.545 
Specifically, Judge Rogers argued that the Suspension Clause 
“makes no reference to citizens or even to persons” and is 
 
 539. Hernández, 757 F.3d at 268 (citing Cannatella, 810 F.2d at 1374–75 
(emphasis added)). 
 540. See id. at 268 (“The significantly different language leads us to the 
conclusion that [the] sufficient connections test . . . does not apply in 
interpreting the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 541. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 542. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 849 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“I conclude that the text and history of the Suspension Clause 
provide no basis for our jurisdiction . . . .”); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that the Suspension Clause did not apply to the 
petitioner there). 
 543. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 337. 
 544. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843–50 (analyzing the text and history 
of the Suspension Clause). 
 545. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 995–96 (2007) (Rogers, J., 
dissenting) (looking to the text of the Suspension Clause to reject the 
contention that the Clause could not be invoked), overruled by Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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included in Article I, which sets limits on Congress’s powers.546 
Judge Rogers contrasted the unqualified language of the 
Suspension Clause with the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments, which respectively refer to “people,” “person,” and 
“the accused.”547 He also noted that the provision immediately 
following the Suspension Clause in Article I, Section 9, which 
provides that “no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed,”548 similarly uses unqualified language in setting limits 
on government power.549 
These textual ambiguities render broader structural 
principles, such as separation of powers, all the more important 
in determining the extraterritorial scope of constitutional 
protections.550 As Timothy Zick argues, ways to “narrow some of 
the Constitution’s internal gaps” include “more careful attention 
to and application of the Constitution’s spatial structure.”551 
Boumediene did just that by stressing that the Executive 
Branch’s manipulation of territory could disrupt separation of 
powers, allowing the “political branches to govern without legal 
constraint.”552 As explained below, the border enforcement cases 
reflect apprehension about the Executive Branch’s ability to 
manipulate constitutional rights in at least two ways: by 
manipulating the border as a legal construct, and by 
manipulating national security concerns. 
 
 546. Id. 
 547. See id. at 996 (referring to the “plain text” of the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments to conclude that they “confer rights to the persons listed”). 
 548. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 549. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 996–97 (noting that “the ban on ex post 
facto legislation” restricts government power by “confin[ing] the legislature to 
penal decisions with prospective effect”). 
 550. See Zick, supra note 527, at 532, 606 (arguing that “broader structural 
principles and constitutional values have increasingly been relied upon to 
resolve textual uncertainties with regard to domain and to settle jurisdictional 
conflicts”). 
 551. Id. at 601; see also id. at 602 (“Insofar as territorial displacements 
affect . . . collective interests, we ought to look to the Constitution’s structural 
principles for political and judicial remedies.”). 
 552. Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 765. 
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2. Manipulation of the Border as Legal Construct 
Historically, legal manipulation of the border has deprived 
noncitizens of basic rights and protections.553 Although the 
physical border between the United States and Mexico may not 
change, the government has long manipulated the border as a 
legal construct, moving its functional location inwards or 
outwards in ways that affect legal protections and benefits.554  
The “entry fiction” doctrine in immigration law reflects this 
type of manipulation by treating noncitizens already inside the 
United States as if they were outside seeking entry.555 As Ayelet 
Shachar has explained, the Executive Branch manipulates the 
legal border both by moving it inward with policies such as 
expedited removal that extend into the interior, and by moving 
it outwards through pre-inspections in foreign countries, safe 
 
 553. Cf. Zick, supra note 527, at 517 (arguing that “governmental control 
over and manipulation of place, geography, and territory can be very 
dangerous to individual liberty”). 
 554. See Cecilia Menjívar, Immigration Law Beyond Borders: 
Externalizing and Internalizing Border Controls in an Era of Securitization, 
10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353, 354 (2014) (discussing “the expansion of 
borders beyond the physical demarcation between two nations”); Lori A. 
Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2009) (explaining how the United States, Europe, and 
other nations are “moving the locus of border enforcement efforts beyond their 
own terrestrial borders and floating such borders into the sea or landing them 
on territories of foreign countries, in order to halt the flow of refugees”); Huyen 
Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115 (2008) (arguing 
that federal, state, and local laws denying access to multiple essential benefits 
based on immigration status effectively deny the ability to live in the United 
States); Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 
STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 165, 167 (2007) (describing the border as “a 
moving barrier, a legal construct that is not tightly fixed to territorial 
benchmarks”); Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the 
Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 403 (2007) (noting the 
“malleability” of the border); Zick, supra note 527, at 601 (“[T]he legal mapping 
of geographic borders can be determinative of access to fundamental liberties 
like due process and equality.”); Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic 
Borders: A Necessary Step Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 203, 205 (2002) (arguing that the processes for implementing 
immigration policies create barriers of their own, distorting substantive 
immigration laws). 
 555. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 
(1953) (“For purposes of the immigration laws . . . the legal incidents of an 
alien’s entry remain unaltered whether he has been here once before or not.”). 
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third country agreements, and other measures.556 The Third 
Circuit’s decision in Castro builds on this type of manipulation 
by treating noncitizens apprehended after entering the United 
States and placed in expedited removal proceedings as if they 
were seeking admission at the border.557 
The recent expansion of expedited removal to individuals 
apprehended anywhere in the United States within two years of 
entry amplifies the extraordinary nature of Castro’s reasoning. 
If extended to this new context, Castro’s application of the entry 
fiction doctrine to expedited removal cases would have startling 
effects. It would mean that even someone who has lived in the 
United States for up to two years and is apprehended in the 
middle of the country would be treated as if seeking admission 
at the border and, under Castro, lack any constitutional 
rights.558 Huyen Pham has argued that federal, state, and local 
laws denying a multitude of benefits to undocumented 
immigrants communicate symbolic messages of prejudice, foster 
racial and ethnic profiling, and “create permanent borders of 
discrimination” that harm all those who “look or sound foreign,” 
regardless of immigration status.559 Like those “moving border 
laws,” the proposed expansion of expedited removal policy 
manipulates the border in a way that sends a clear message of 
long-term exclusion from social membership. 
In the cross-border shooting cases, the manipulation is in 
arguing that constitutional rights designed to deter certain 
conduct cease to apply simply because a bullet happens to land 
on one side of the border instead of the other.560 This appears 
 
 556. See Shachar, supra note 554, at 172–81 (discussing the different ways 
in which the Executive Branch uses enforcement tactics to expand the legal 
border). 
 557. See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir. 
2016) (finding the individuals “apprehended within hours of surreptitiously 
entering the United States” to be “alien[s] seeking initial admission to the 
United States”). 
 558. However, given that Castro and Osorio-Martinez also discussed ties 
to the United States, it is unclear whether the Third Circuit would follow the 
same approach in a case arising under the expanded expedited removal policy 
that involves someone with strong ties to the country. 
 559. See Pham, supra note 554, at 1122, 1163. 
 560. See Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 756–57 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (stating that it makes little sense for a remedy designed to deter 
certain conduct “to turn on a happenstance subsequent to the conduct—a 
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especially manipulative given the “near irrelevance of  [the] 
midculvert line . . . for most border-related purposes.”561 
Allowing such arbitrary distinctions to result in the denial of 
constitutional claims reinforces prejudicial views that some 
lives are more valuable than others. 
In the metering case, Al Otro Lado, the district court was 
also concerned about an arbitrary distinction in rejecting the 
government’s argument that asylum seekers stopped on the 
international bridge could not avail themselves of due process 
protections because they were not technically in the United 
States.562 The court realized that distinguishing asylum seekers 
who had made it to a port of entry from those stopped some feet 
away on an international bridge would make both the statutory 
and constitutional protections for asylum seekers vulnerable to 
manipulation by the Executive Branch.563 Thus, the court 
stressed that “[t]he lesson of Boumediene is that the political 
branches do not enjoy the prerogative to ‘switch the 
Constitution on or off at will.’”564  
The “Remain in Mexico” policy poses an even more extreme 
example of manipulation of the legal border than “metering.” By 
moving asylum seekers who are in United States removal 
proceedings to Mexico, it separates their physical location from 
the location of their legal process. This prevents them from 
establishing any type of communal or political membership in 
the United States, while also limiting their movement abroad, 
since they must stay close to the border for their court hearings. 
Instead of extending access to justice through the asylum 
process, it perpetuates the injustice of exclusion and 
 
bullet landing in one half of a culvert, not the other”); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 
899 F.3d 719, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (reasoning that it would be wrong to preclude 
the claim simply because an injury “happened a few feet into the other side of 
the border”). 
 561. Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2010–11 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
 562. Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 55, at 76. 
 563. See id. (concluding that the “New Individual Plaintiffs” stated 
procedural due process claims). 
 564. Id. 
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segregation.565 If left unchecked, such extreme manipulation of 
the border as a legal construct could result in a law-free zone 
where human rights are routinely violated with no judicial 
review.  
3. Manipulation of National Security as an Illusory Threat 
The second manipulation concern that emerges from the 
border enforcement cases is manipulation of national security 
as an illusory threat to urge deference to the political branches. 
The anti-manipulation principle may be hardest to implement 
in cases implicating national security and foreign affairs, where 
the executive power is at its peak and the judiciary is the most 
constrained.566 But that is also precisely when the principle is 
most needed to protect against abuse of power. Indeed, 
Boumediene applied it in a case involving “enemy combatants” 
during the “war on terror.”567 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,568 another 
war-on-terror case, the Court observed that, even in times of 
conflict, the Constitution “most assuredly envisions a role for all 
three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”569 
Additionally, the Court has cautioned against rote reliance on 
national security as “a talisman used to ward off inconvenient 
 
 565. Cf. Zick, supra note 527, at 602 (arguing that “(re-)spatialization of 
justice and liberty . . . will require, at a minimum, a more robust judicial rule 
in setting limits on immigration policy and enforcement”). 
 566. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately 
related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for 
judicial intervention.”); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) 
(stating that “the political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility 
and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns”); see also Doe v. 
Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has never 
implied a Bivens remedy in a case involving the military, national security, or 
intelligence.”); Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 207–09 (3d Cir. 
2017) (concluding that special factors weighed against implying a Bivens 
action as the TSA is “tasked with assisting in a critical aspect of national 
security,” and “[t]he threat of damages liability could . . . increase the 
probability that a TSA agent would hesitate in making split-second 
decisions”). 
 567. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (stating that “the 
test for determining the scope of this provision must not be subject to 
manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain”). 
 568. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
 569. Id. at 536. 
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claims—a ‘label’ used to ‘cover a multitude of sins.’”570 However, 
the Court has been reluctant to take as strong a stand in cases 
implicating national security that involve constitutional tort 
claims for damages.571 
Since the 9/11 attacks, the conflation of border enforcement 
and national security has been greatly amplified, producing the 
term “border security” and fusing concerns about immigration 
and terrorism.572 Consequently, one of the most critical 
questions in analyzing these issues is whether a case actually 
implicates national security, or if one party is manipulating 
national security concerns in order to avoid judicial review, 
receive deference, or escape a remedy. The cross-border shooting 
cases exemplify different responses to this question.  
In Hernández II, the Fifth Circuit found that national 
security was implicated simply because the events took place at 
the border. The court was vexed about Border Patrol agents’ 
ability to make “split second decisions,” analogizing to a Third 
Circuit case involving a TSA agent, even though TSA agents are 
not law enforcement officers trained on constitutional 
 
 570. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017) (quoting Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985)). 
 571. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009) (finding the plaintiff’s 
claim for damages deficient in several respects); see also George D. Brown, 
Accountability, Liability, and the War on Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits as 
Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 FLA. L. REV. 193, 242–48 (2011) 
(discussing the role of national security deference in creating challenges to 
bringing tort suits); George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter Terrorism via 
Lawsuit”—The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 895–900 (2009) 
(discussing differences between damages suits and habeas petitions); Andrew 
Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1123, 1125 (2014) (collecting appellate court cases dismissing Bivens 
claims because special factors counsel against extraterritorial Bivens actions 
related to national security); Peter S. Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official 
Wrongs: The Need for Bivens Suits in National Security Cases, 68 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1153, 1175 (2018) (noting the effects of “the Supreme Court’s 2010 
decision limiting remedies in Iqbal”). 
 572. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration 
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 
1853 (2007) (explaining that the term “national security” is “deployed in a 
nebulous manner” in the immigration debate); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard 
Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the 
Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1396–1404 
(2007) (arguing that the “war on terror” transformed the discussion of border 
enforcement into a national security issue). 
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doctrines.573 Judge Prado’s dissent, on the other hand, found 
that the case had “nothing to do with terrorism” and did not 
significantly implicate border security.574 In his view, the case 
“more closely resemble[d] ordinary civil litigation against a 
federal agent than a case involving a true inquiry into sensitive 
national security and military affairs, which are properly 
committed to the Executive Branch.”575  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hernández II affirmed the 
Fifth Circuit, finding national security concerns based on the 
Border Patrol’s general responsibility to “protect the illegal 
entry of dangerous persons and goods.”576 Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent, however, could “not grasp how allowing a Bivens action 
here would intrude on the political branches’ national-security 
prerogatives,” given the instructions Border Patrol agents 
receive prohibiting the unjustified use of deadly force.577 Both 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Hernández II and Rodriguez quoted 
Abbasi’s warning that national security concerns must not 
become a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims—a label 
used to “cover a multitude of sins.”578 
Other uses of force against migrants, such as the incidents 
involving cross-border spraying of tear gas described in Part II, 
have also been justified by national security concerns. As the 
caravan of migrants that was eventually tear gassed headed 
north towards the border, President’s Trump described it as a 
would-be “invasion” by “bad people,” “terrorists,” and “Middle 
 
 573. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 819 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(rejecting the implication of “a private right of action for damages in the 
transnational context” (citing Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d 
Cir. 2017))); see also id. at 828–29 (Prado, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority’s reliance on Vanderklok was misplaced because TSA agents typically 
are not trained on constitutional doctrines that govern law enforcement 
officers, whereas Border Patrol Agent Mesa was trained on the reasonable use 
of force). 
 574. See id. at 827–28 (Prado, J., dissenting) (identifying the contradiction 
in the majority’s argument that any incident taking place at the border 
implicates border security). 
 575. Id. at 829. 
 576. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 746 (2020). 
 577. Id. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 578. Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017) (citations omitted); see 
Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 758; Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 745–46 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
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Easterners.”579 He then used this purported threat to deploy 
thousands of troops to the border, authorizing them to use lethal 
force if necessary.580 Human Rights First and other 
organizations argued that the Trump Administration had 
“cultivated this alleged crisis.”581  
Despite the Trump Administration’s rhetoric describing 
migrants as criminals and gang members who “prey on our 
citizens,”582 the government’s own data indicate that less than 
three percent of individuals apprehended by Border Patrol are 
criminals or gang members.583 Furthermore, apprehensions 
along the Southern border are at “record low levels,”584 having 
dropped from over a million a year decades ago to around 
300,000.585 Recidivism rates—the percentage of individuals 
apprehended by Border Patrol more than once within a fiscal 
year—have similarly dropped over the past five years.586  
 
 579. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, REFUGEE BLOCKAGE: THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION’S OBSTRUCTION OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AT THE BORDER 1 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/NRW4-AU5Z (PDF). 
 580. Id. 
 581. Id. 
 582. See Philip Bump, Here’s Everything Donald Trump Said About 
Immigration in His Speech to Congress, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017 12:23 PM), 
https://perma.cc/LNT6-5QF9 (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (recounting President 
Trump’s statement that he is “removing gang members, drug dealers and 
criminals that threaten our communities and prey on our citizens”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 583. CBP Enforcement Statistics FY 2019, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 
PROTECTION, https://perma.cc/7VKH-N75X (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Of the 310,531 individuals that 
Border Patrol apprehended nationwide in FY 2017, only 8,531 (2.7%) had 
criminal convictions. Id. In the first part of FY 2018, October 1, 2017 to June 
30, 2018, only 1.9% of all apprehensions by Border Patrol were convicted 
criminals. Id. The number of gang members apprehended is even smaller, just 
536 people in FY 2017 (0.0017% of all apprehensions). Id. 
 584. Id. 
 585. See Southwest Border Migration FY 2019, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 
PROTECTION, https://perma.cc/DWK6-3MCA (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) 
(summarizing and documenting total apprehensions along the Southern 
border for FY 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 586. See CBP Enforcement Statistics FY 2019, supra note 583 
(summarizing instances in which CBP apprehended individuals who had been 
apprehended previously). 
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In short, not only do Border Patrol agents exercise 
significant authority with minimal review of their actions,587 but 
the President has encouraged abusive practices by falsely 
portraying ordinary migrants as a national security threat and 
militarizing border operations. Since Bivens aims to deter 
unconstitutional conduct in situations “where official action is 
unconstrained,”588 there are good reasons to extend it to 
situations involving Border Patrol officers who use excessive 
force, especially when that force is lethal. 
In the expedited removal cases, which involve the right to 
habeas, not a Bivens remedy, the Third and Ninth Circuits did 
not discuss national security concerns, although the Ninth 
Circuit did note that the Suspension Clause protects the right 
to habeas “even in circumstances—such as national security, in 
Boumediene—where the executive’s power is at its zenith.”589 
Both Castro and Thuraissigiam involved asylum seekers who 
had negative credible fear determinations, which represents the 
situation of many noncitizens subjected to expedited removal.590 
There is no reason to think individuals in this situation 
represent a threat to national security.591 Yet, the DHS’s notice 
announcing an expansion of expedited removal raises the 
specter of national security as a justification. In explaining why 
 
 587. See Alexandra A. Botsaris, Note, Hernández v. Mesa: Preserving the 
Zone of Constitutional Uncertainty at the Border, 77 MD. L. REV. 832, 848–50 
(2018) (explaining that CBP agents have more authority than traditional law 
enforcement officers and receive inadequate training and screening). 
 588. Bernard W. Bell, Reexamining Bivens after Ziglar v. Abbasi, 9 
CONLAWNOW 77, 85 (2018). 
 589. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 917 F.3d 1097, 
1108 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 797–98 (2008)). 
 590. See, e.g., Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 835 F.3d 422, 428 
(3d Cir. 2016) (recounting that the asylum seeker received a “negative credible 
fear” determination); Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1101 (same). 
 591. See Vanessa M. Garza, Comment, Unheard and Deported: The 
Unconstitutional Denial of Habeas Corpus in Expedited Removal, 56 HOUSTON 
L. REV. 881, 923 (2019) (stating that immigrants from Mexico and Central 
America often are victims of violence and do not engage in terrorist activities 
against the United States and calling the national security argument 
“misleading political rhetoric”); see also Alvaro Peralta, Note, Bordering 
Persecution: Why Asylum Seekers Should Not be Subject to Expedited Removal, 
64 AM. U. L. REV. 1303, 1311–13 (2015) (arguing that expedited removal 
imposes procedural hurdles that result in the denial of meritorious asylum 
claims). 
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the expanded policy was issued without any advance notice or 
an opportunity for public comment, the DHS asserted that 
“delayed implementation could lead to a surge in migration 
across the southern border during a notice-and-comment 
period.”592  
Similarly, the DHS has invoked an illusory national 
security threat in justifying both “metering” and the “Remain in 
Mexico” policies. When then-Secretary of Homeland Security 
Kirstjen Nielsen announced the “metering” policy, she described 
it as related to the “loophole” of asylum that is “so abused,” 
suggesting that asylum cases tend to be frivolous or fraudulent, 
despite data showing significant grant rates.593 In January 
2019, when the DHS issued a press release on the “Remain in 
Mexico” policy, it claimed that this new policy would address the 
“security and humanitarian crisis on the Southern border,” 
“help restore a safe and orderly immigration process [and] 
decrease the number of those taking advantage of the 
immigration system,” and “reduce threats to life, national 
security, and public safety.”594 The press release went on to 
describe the activities of “smugglers, traffickers, gangs, and 
criminals” that “endanger the security of the U.S.” and 
concluded that the situation has “severe impacts on U.S. border 
security.”595  
Thus, while extraterritoriality cases related to conventional 
wars or the “war on terror” involved legitimate national security 
concerns, in the border enforcement context, there is a 
heightened risk of the Executive Branch manipulating illusory 
national security threats to urge deference to its policies, 
discourage judicial review of the actions of Border Patrol agents, 
and justify the denial of remedies. It is therefore essential for 
courts to closely and critically examine whether the policy or 
action at issue actually implicates national security.  
 
 592. 2019 Designation, supra note 13, at 35,413. 
 593. See Entralgo, supra note 37 (discussing the language used by the 
Executive Branch in regards to the asylum system); Asylum Decision Rates, 
EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ADJUDICATION STAT., https://perma.cc
/DP6Z-E6B4 (last updated Oct. 23, 2019) (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (showing a 
grant rate of 20.51% in FY 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 594. MPP Press Release, supra note 12. 
 595. Id. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the manipulation of the 
border as a legal construct and manipulation of national 
security are connected. The outward and inward expansion of 
the legal border has accompanied the reconceptualization of 
border enforcement as a national security issue.596 Both types of 
manipulation enhance government control, create new forms of 
subordination, and are sustained by the criminalization of 
immigrants in general, including asylum seekers, 
undocumented individuals, and those in transit who have not 
even reached the United States.597 
VI. Conclusion 
Recent shifts in border enforcement policies threaten to 
create “a dangerous band of law-free territory designed to 
prevent access to United States legal protections,” including 
constitutional protections.598 This threat exists even when a 
significant part of the alleged constitutional violation occurs in 
the United States. While both Verdugo and Boumediene offer 
hope of constitutional protections that stretch beyond the 
territorial border, they leave many questions unanswered. 
Courts have struggled to determine whether, when, and how to 
apply the “substantial connections” and “functional” tests in the 
border enforcement context and beyond. After analyzing these 
decisions, this Article proposes a composite test that draws on 
Verdugo, Boumediene, and fundamental rights, explaining how 
the factors could be applied in a broader array of cases. 
One of the toughest issues that emerges from border 
enforcement cases involving noncitizens outside the United 
States is the interaction between the plenary power doctrine 
and the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence. The decisions 
discussed above are just beginning to probe the complex and 
undertheorized relationship between these constitutional fields. 
This Article extracts three models for thinking about that 
relationship from the case law, highlighting that there is more 
than one way to understand the interaction and that a court’s 
approach can profoundly affect the outcome of the case. This 
 
 596. See Menjívar, supra note 554, at 354–57, 362–63 (analyzing the 
evolution of the discourse on border enforcement). 
 597. Id. 
 598. Al Otro Lado, Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 
supra note 379, at 25–26. 
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makes it all the more important for courts to consciously address 
how they are approaching the interaction, rather than allowing 
the plenary power doctrine to implicitly influence their 
decisions. A model that emphasizes the legislative and 
constitutional constraints on plenary power would protect 
against executive abuses and preserve judicial review where 
fundamental rights are at stake. 
The extraterritorial border enforcement cases also reinforce 
the crucial role of the judiciary in protecting against the 
Executive Branch’s manipulation of constitutional rights. This 
Article identified two important types of manipulation of which 
courts should be aware: manipulation of the border as a legal 
construct and manipulation of national security as an illusory 
threat. While neither form of manipulation is new, the 
Executive’s manipulation of the border has taken on novel and 
extreme forms, and there is an ever-widening gap between 
rhetoric and reality where national security is concerned. 
Separation of powers principles may be the last stand in 
stopping such manipulation, requiring the judiciary to enforce 
constitutional rights beyond the border.  
